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Abstract 
This project was designed to develop the Corporate Safety Culture Scale, a unique 
measure of corporate safety culture that is supported by a strong theoretical foundation.  
Items were developed conceptually, discussed in cognitive interviews, and submitted to 
expert review.  Survey items were administered to employees of a large public 
transportation organization.  Principle components analysis reduced the data and 
identified an empirical model.  The empirical model held two domains identified as: 1) 
“Values,” and 2) “Behavior.”  Confirmatory factor analysis compared the fit of the 
empirical model with that of a modified empirical model, and the hypothesized model, 
which held the following three domains: 1) “Behavior,” 2) “Values,” and 3) “Meaning 
Systems.” Goodness of fit indices (Chi-Squared, RMSEA, CFI, ECVI) identified the 
modified empirical structure as the model with best fit.   The similarities between the 
hypothesized and modified empirical models suggested that the CSCS carries strong 
theoretical support.   
The measure’s reliability was tested using Cronbach’s Alpha.  The full CSCS and 
each identified domain were shown to have strong Alpha values.  One-way between 
groups analysis of variance, was used to evaluate the relationship between scores on the 
full measure and a categorical safety behavior item.  Findings suggested that high scorers 
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on the CSCS were safer workers than those with lower scores on the measure.  A post 
hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD showed that scores on the full CSCS, and the 
“Behavior” domain were significantly related to safety behavior.  The analysis of 
variance and the post hoc results indicated that a relationship exists between the CSCS 
and safety behavior.  This finding added to the validity of the measure.  The CSCS was 
shown to be a theoretically supported, valid and reliable measure that can be used to 
evaluate corporate safety culture. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STUDY OVERVIEW 
Purpose 
This study was designed to develop and validate the Corporate Safety Culture 
Scale (CSCS), a measure of corporate safety culture.  In an effort to address diverse 
conceptualizations of corporate culture and corporate safety culture, the measure was 
built from a theoretical foundation which combined three common conceptual theories of 
corporate culture.  A theoretical factor structure, composed of three domains (Meaning 
systems, Values, and Behavioral Expectations) was compared to an empirical model, 
developed through principle components analysis.  A one-way between groups analysis 
of variance was used to assess construct validity.  
Introduction 
Workplace Accidents 
The significance of workplace accidents was first publically identified in 1970, 
after public officials recognized that the rate of occupational accidents increased by 20% 
during the 1960’s.  With the implementation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
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of 1970, three related organizations were formed: the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). 
Combined, these organizations were used to create, evaluate, and enforce occupational 
safety (Workplace Safety Tips, 2010).  
With the creation of OSHA, the value of workplace safety was enforced in 
companies across the United States.  However, it was not until the 1980’s that 
organizations operating in high risk industries began to emphasize and self regulate safety 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986).  Workplace accidents, defined as 
unanticipated occurrences that are preceded by unsafe behaviors or conditions 
(DiBerardinis, 1999) have significantly impacted organizations operating within the 
mining, agriculture, construction and transportation industries.  In 2007 alone, these 
industries recorded a combined total of 2,768 employee fatalities (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2010).  In the transportation sector, safety has garnered particular interest as 
greater than 41% of work-place accidents, across all industries, occur during periods of 
transportation (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010).  The high rate of accidents in 
transportation is alarming because it limits productivity, and negatively influences the 
physical and psychological health of employees. 
Physical Psychological and Financial  
The most observable consequences of workplace accidents are often physical. As 
a result of unexpected events, employees may suffer from bodily injuries, illnesses or 
even death.  The U.S. department of labor (2010) reported that in 2008 alone, 5,214 
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individuals were killed as a result of workplace accidents.  In the same year, state and 
local employees experienced workplace injuries and illness at a rate of 6.3 cases per 100 
equivalent full-time employees. In the private sector, occupational illnesses and injuries 
were recorded at a rate of 3.9 cases per 100 full-time workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 
(2009). 
In addition to the physical setbacks caused by the occurrence of workplace 
accidents, workers have been shown to experience psychological distress.  If an employee 
perceives the endangerment of their personal safety or the safety of significant others as a 
result of a specific event, he/she may experience symptoms of anxiety.  These indicators 
of anxiety might include: fear, helplessness or horror, recurrent distressing images or 
thoughts of the event, intense psychological distress at exposure to cues that remind the 
individual of the event, persistent avoidance of feelings or situations that prompt thoughts 
of the experience, and persistent symptoms of increased arousal (Mitchell & Everly, 
2001).  The presence of these symptoms may lead to the psychological diagnosis of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Acute Stress Disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000).  
Additionally, exposure to traumatic events may also lead employees to experience 
the following symptoms nearly everyday: a depressed mood, markedly diminished 
interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities, significant weight loss or gain, 
insomnia or hyper-somnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue or loss of 
energy, feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt, diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, indecisiveness, and recurrent thoughts of death (Norris, Kaniasty, & 
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Thompson, 1997).  The occurrence of these symptoms may signify the presence of Major 
Depressive Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
It is important to note that damage caused by workplace accidents goes beyond 
the psychological and physical setbacks experienced by employees.  As a workforce 
copes with the aftermath of an accident, a corporation often suffers a financial loss as a 
result of reduced productivity.  Research shows that psychological difficulties, including 
depression (Simon, Ludman, Unutzer, Operskalski, & Bauer, 2008), and stress 
(Marciniak, Lage, Landbloom, Dunayevich, & Bowman, 2004) account for significant 
productivity costs.  Kessler and Frank (1997) reported that affective disorders including 
both depression and anxiety account for a total of 25 lost work days each month per 100 
workers.  This statistical finding is equivalent to an annualized national projection of over 
4 million work lost days.  The damaging effect of work place accidents on productivity is 
clearly shown within the transportation industry.  As a result of illness or injury, the 
United States department of labor documented an incidence rate of 2.5 days away from 
work per every 100 transportation employees in 2008.  The incident rate increased to 3.9 
when the department of labor included cases with job transfers and job restrictions (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2009).  
Origin of Accidents	  
In the aftermath of a workplace accident, investigators focus on identifying 
culpability for the unplanned incidents.  Avoidable occupational incidents are typically 
the result of human error.  The unsafe blunders may be systemic or personal. (Reason, 
2000).  Personal errors refer to individual acts of danger or procedural violations.  Often 
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personal errors are the result of distraction, lack of interest, sloppiness, negligence, 
thoughtlessness, haste, and recklessness.  Workplace accidents resulting from purely 
personal errors often allow for uncomplicated responses.  Because the liable individual is 
the sole cause of the accident, the organization of the company does not have to change. 
However, many argue that workplace accidents are typically caused by both personal and 
systemic errors.   
Systemic errors describe organizational processes that allow for accidents to 
occur.  For example, the 1998 explosion at the Esso natural gas plant was thought to be 
caused by systemic problems.  The gas plant suffered a two-day fire after a lean oil pump 
failed, causing a fracture in the exchanger.  In this event, no individual employee directly 
caused the blowout.  However, the mechanical failure was the result of poor plant design, 
training, supervision, management, communication and reporting (Boult & Pitblado, 
2001).  A similar systemic problem is hypothesized to be responsible BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon well explosion.  Here, the off shore rig exploded due to a burnout caused by 
uncontained natural gas. The explosion led to 11 employee deaths and a record-setting oil 
leak in the Gulf of Mexico (Kerr, Kintisch, & Stokstad, 2010).  When evaluating the 
catastrophe, investigators point to problems with maintenance and operations (Witze, 
2010).   
When describing safeguards against workplace accidents, Reason, (1990) noted 
that all safety measures contain flaws.  Although each measure is expected to fully 
prevent accidents, alone they are incomplete.  The author explained that the protective 
features are imperfect because active failures and latent conditions exist.  Active failures 
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reference the personal mistakes that exist within any organization.  They may occur in the 
form of procedural violations, slips, misjudgments, and drops.  These mistakes can lead 
to catastrophic accidents.  Reason cites the Chernobyl calamity, prior to which employees 
violated procedures by disabling safety systems.  As a result, the plant explosion was not 
prevented.  As was previously mentioned, workplace accidents are rarely caused by 
personal errors alone.  Reason notes that latent conditions, defined as structural 
circumstances that allow for mishaps to occur, are inevitably involved in workplace 
accidents.  The researcher explained that these conditions may present as  
“error provoking conditions within the local workplace (time pressure, 
understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue, and inexperience) and they 
can create long lasting holes or weaknesses in the defenses (untrustworthy 
alarms and indicators, unworkable procedures, design and construction 
deficiencies, etc)” (Reason, 2000).   
 
When left unresolved, latent conditions can exist enduringly prior to an unwanted 
incident.  The conditions lie undeveloped until they are triggered by active failures.  In an 
effort to describe an effective error management approach, Reason referenced the 
structure of Swiss cheese.  Alone, a single slice of Swiss cheese has many visible holes. 
Like Swiss cheese, protective efforts have holes, through which errors can occur.  When 
isolated, a single protective measure is not sufficient to avoid workplace accidents, too 
many holes exist.  However, most organizations have many protective barriers.  Like 
layers of Swiss cheese, when these defenses are held together, the gaps become filled.   
For this reason, the author explained that a single latent condition or active failure does 
not typically result in an accident.  The supporting barriers protect against an unwanted 
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incident.  When accidents occur, they are created in the rare moments that an active 
failure exposes a single hole through each of the defensive layers (Reason, 2000).  
Corporate Safety Culture	  
The combined set of a corporation’s safety-related attitudes, shared meanings, 
behaviors, practices, and beliefs, can be labeled the corporation’s safety culture.  Safety 
culture is important as it reduces the prevalence of what Reason (2000) called active 
failures and latent conditions.  When safety becomes a priority over productivity, 
companies with strong safety cultures are believed to be the most protected and safe 
organizations.  Approximately 25 years ago, the concept of corporate culture became 
significant to investigators working in safety management, because it was believed to be 
a significant moderator of employee behavior.  This focus on culture as a predictor of 
corporate safety was prompted, in large part, by the 1986 nuclear catastrophe at 
Chernobyl.  After this tragic accident, and several other significant work-place calamities 
involving chemical plants, commuter boats, oil tankers, freight trains and commercial 
aircraft, investigators observed that commonalities existed in the conditions surrounding 
each accident.  Hopfl (1994) explained that “despite the obvious differences in the 
industries involved and their technologies,….at a contextual level, there [were] many 
common characteristics (Reason, 1990, as cited in Hopfl, 1994).  As researchers 
identified circumstantial similarities, they began to emphasize social and organizational 
factors in their evaluations of work place accidents (Hopfl, 1994). This amended focus 
was shown in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) updated safety report on 
the accident at Chernobyl.  The IAEA report explained that “the accident … flowed from 
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a deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet 
design, operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time” 
(International Safety Advisory Group, 1991).  
The impact of corporate culture was also revealed after the 2003 Challenger 
Space Shuttle disaster.  This tragedy was caused by a combination of latent conditions 
that, though foreseeable, were not corrected prior to the shuttle launch.  In 2003, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had a history of success.  The 
organization had not experienced an in-flight accident in the 17 years prior the 2003 
tragedy.  Though engineers were aware of structural problems, the glitches were ignored 
and considered acceptable risks for the Challenger exploration (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, 2003).  NASA had a culture focused more on success than safety. 
As a consequence, when the Challenger space shuttle reentered the earth’s atmosphere, a 
crack in the thermal protection system led to a major catastrophe (National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, 2003). 
Given the influence of corporate culture on safety, it is no surprise that 
investigators have started evaluating the culture at BP (previously known as British 
Petroleum) in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon blowout and gas explosion.   As a 
result of the accident, eleven BP employees are presumed dead, and over 1 billion gallons 
of oil have leaked into the Gulf of Mexico. This is not the only accident associated with 
BP. In 2005, a BP refinery located in Texas exploded, killing 15 employees and injuring 
180 additional people. The company was also associated with the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil 
spill in Alaska.  BP held a controlling interest in the Alaskan oil consortium, which was 
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largely responsible for the cleanup effort, and heavily criticized for errors. In reference to 
BP’s accident record, Rep. Joe Barton stated that BP has created a “corporate culture of 
seeming indifference to safety and environmental issues” (Mauer, 2010).   
Statement of the Problem 
Following the IAEA report, research on corporate safety culture proliferated.  As 
a result of the hypothesized predictive power of corporate culture, managers, consultants, 
engineers, psychologists and industrialists, all working with different theoretical 
backgrounds, were interested in the far reaching impact of the construct.  Although this 
common interest increased the relevance and study of corporate culture, it did not allow 
for the development of a systematic examination of the construct.  These early 
investigators agreed on the influence of culture but were unable to unanimously support a 
single conceptualization or definition.  Due to the diverse occupational and theoretical 
circumstances, the literature on culture became disorganized, lacking in consistent theory. 
Today, the research remains chaotic as investigators continue to debate interpretations of 
corporate culture (Pidgeon, 1998).   
Justification of the Study 
Literature consistently demonstrates a relationship between corporate culture and 
organizational growth and performance (Deshpande, Farley, & Webster, 1993; Miron, 
Erez, & Naheh, 2004; Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Prather, & Turrell, 2002).  However, the 
various theoretical positions of different investigators limit the interpretability of these 
findings.  It becomes challenging to comprehend the results of any given assessment of 
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corporate culture because every measure takes a different perspective.  Moreover, 
common quantitative measures of corporate culture deviate from the construct of culture 
and unintentionally assesses corporate climate.   
The creation of a single measurement tool that is built on a solid theoretical 
foundation, and pointedly assesses corporate culture would be extremely valuable.  The 
corporate executive could then use the measure to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
the state of his/her company’s culture.  This would be especially be important in the 
measurement of safety culture, as the repercussions of a poor safety culture can be dire 
(Hopfl, 1994; Reason, 1990).   
By unifying the research into a single, comprehensive measure, this study will 
enable executives to predict and avoid company disasters.  As opposed to identifying 
culture problems after the occurrence of large-scale accidents, as has been shown in the 
case of BP and Compania Minera San Esteban, companies will have the ability to 
identify problems in safety culture prior to accidents. The use of a valid and reliable 
comprehensive measure of safety culture could save the lives of employees and increase 
productivity.  
Research Questions 
1) Will the hypothesized three factor structure used to select items for the Corporate 
Safety Culture Scale fit the data better or worse than the empirically derived 
factor structure, and the modified empirical factor structure?  
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i. Utilize exploratory factor analysis to derive the empirical factor 
structure. 
ii. Use confirmatory factor analysis to develop the experimental 
model. 
iii. Use confirmatory factor analysis to build the empirical factor 
model. 
iv. Improve the fit of the empirical factor structure by consulting 
theory and the modification indices produced by confirmatory 
factor analysis. Then use confirmatory factor analysis to build the 
modified empirical factor structure. 
v.  Compare the model fit of the empirical, modified empirical, and 
experimental structures.  
2) Will the developed Corporate Safety Culture Scale be a reliable measure of 
corporate safety culture? 
a. Evaluate the Cronbach’s Alpha values of the full measure and each 
identified domain.  
3) Will the developed Corporate Safety Culture Scale be a valid measure of 
corporate safety culture?  
a. Evaluate frequency of safe behaviors by assessing the responses to the 
following question: “I received a performance documentation form for 
using good safety practices during the past 12 months.” 
i. Question has three answer choices: “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure.” 
12	  	  
b. Use one-way between group analysis of variance to evaluate the 
relationship between answers to the behavioral frequency question and 
scores on the CSCS.  
c. Complete a post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD to assess the 
relationship between safety behavior and scores on the full CSCS and each 
identified domain.  
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Definition of Major Concepts 	  
Workplace accidents: Defined as unanticipated occurrences that are preceded by unsafe 
behaviors or conditions (DiBerardinis 1999). 
Corporate Culture:  “The product of individual and group values, attributes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style 
and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (Lee, 1996). 
Corporate Climate:  “A set of characteristics that describe an organization and that (a) 
distinguish the organization from other organizations, (b) are relatively enduring over 
time, and (c) influence the behavior of people in the organization” (Forehand & Gilmer, 
1964). 
Meaning Systems:  Underlying mental constructions that allow for the interpretation and 
understanding of how daily events fall into an individual’s personal narrative.  
Values:  The fundamental moral expectations that an individual uses to appraise daily 
events.  
Behavioral Expectations:  The activities that are anticipated as part of an individual’s 
employment responsibilities.   
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Summary 
 This chapter introduced the problems associated with workplace accidents.  It 
discussed the physical, psychological and financial setbacks that can be created by 
critical incidents in the workplace.  Corporate safety culture was identified as a critical 
component of safety and accident prevention in corporate environments.  The chapter 
explained that current corporate culture literature is unorganized and lacking in consistent 
theory.  It noted that current measurement tools are dissimilar and do not adequately 
measure corporate safety culture.  The importance of a new measurement tool was 
discussed.  The chapter concluded by delineating the research questions of the current 
project.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In common managerial argot, the terms culture and climate are often misused and 
misinterpreted.  Executives frequently refer to culture in reference to an organization’s 
environment, mood, or feel, yet these organizational factors are more closely related to 
climate than culture.  Organizational culture references an underlying quality that impacts 
productivity, structure, strategy and climate within an organization.  Despite its recent 
surge in popularity, culture is an illusive construct that is rarely considered.  For example, 
many managers in high risk industries hope to enhance the safety of their organizations.  
They proactively work to modify their facilities, guidelines, mission statements and 
reward programs.  However, very few consider how cultural assumptions about 
individual success, responsibility, and masculinity may be thwarting their efforts toward 
a safer work environment (Schein, 2000).  It is clear that defining culture and climate, 
and understanding the difference between the two concepts is critical to any evaluation of 
corporate culture.  The following section discusses the etiology and definition of each 
construct.  
Corporate Culture and Corporate Climate 
Climate 
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The notion of corporate climate was first identified in the 1950’s and 1960’s as 
school researchers considered the psychological effects of diverse educational settings 
(Hoy, 1990). They were particularly interested in uncovering the educational benefits of 
different teaching environments, and worked to define and measure different aspects of 
educational atmospheres (Halpin & Croft, 1963). This initial interest in environments was 
appreciated by investigators working in large businesses, that believed climate could 
explain the long-term characteristics of any work environment (Hoy, 1990).  In 1964, 
Forehand and Gilmer defined corporate climate as “a set of characteristics that describe 
an organization and that (a) distinguish the organization from other organizations, (b) are 
relatively enduring over time, and (c) influence the behavior of people in the 
organization.”  Similarly, Taguiri (1968) drew a connection between personality traits 
and an organization’s climate.  The author explained that “a particular configuration of 
enduring characteristics of the ecology, milieu, social system and culture would 
constitute a climate, as much as a particular configuration of personal characteristics 
constitute a personality” (Taguiri 1968 p. 23, as cited in Hoy, 1990).   
Culture vs. Climate	  
Research on corporate climate proliferated because it was understood to be a 
critical construct that could influence employee behavior (James & Jones, 1974).  As the 
concept matured through research, investigators began to identify a distinction between 
the characteristics, behaviors and feelings that are universally supported by an 
organization’s workforce, and the values and beliefs held by most of an organization’s 
employees (Ekvall, 1983).  This recognition of difference led to the identification of 
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corporate culture as opposed to corporate climate.  Globally, corporate climate refers to 
the overt characteristics of an organization’s environment, while corporate culture 
references the underlying values and beliefs of a given organization (Guldenmund, 2000).  
It is clear that the constructs of corporate culture and corporate climate are not mutually 
exclusive.  In fact, they are inter-connected, influencing one another as a company grows 
and works through challenges (Schien, 2004).  
Culture	  
With the identification of culture as an important construct, corporate leaders, 
researchers, managers, and the general public began to develop an interest in the 
possibility of creating an organizational culture that influenced employees to behave in a 
desired manner. This fascination with culture was fueled by the publication of Theory Z: 
How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (Ouchi, 1981).  This well-
received management work suggested that American corporations could increase 
productivity by adopting Japanese management practices.  Specifically, the author 
referred to an organizational shift that would carry a more collectivistic culture, 
characterized by long-term job security, responsibility, group work, and cautious 
promotion and evaluation practices (Ouchi, 1981).   
Similarly, Peters and Waterman’s work, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from 
American’s best run companies (1982) became a seminal management book that 
discussed business from a more flexible perspective. As opposed to focusing on 
productivity alone, the authors suggested that managers reduce bureaucratic control, 
focus on customers, facilitate entrepreneurship, value low-paid employees, centralize 
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company values and maintain a committed management team (Peters & Waterman, 
1982).   
 As the construct of corporate culture entered the awareness of the general 
population, research on the topic proliferated.  Investigators with different occupational 
and theoretical backgrounds began exploring the impact of culture, finding that positive 
cultures correlate with positive financial outcomes (Denison, 1990; Kotter & Heskett, 
1992).  Although researchers agreed on the value of culture, their fundamental theoretical 
differences led to variant definitions of the construct.  As a result, the burgeoning 
research continued to expand without a solid theoretical foundation.  Today, the literature 
remains theoretically disorganized (Pidgeon, 1998; Schien, 2004).  In an effort to 
describe the unsystematic mass of literature, several investigators have created large, all-
inclusive, models of corporate culture.  In the following section models created by 
Keesing, Allaire and Firsirotu, and Schein are described.  
Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Culture 
Keesing   
Keesing (1974) showed that conceptualizations can be placed in two broad 
categories, those that perceive culture as a component of a social system, sociocultural, 
and those that view culture as a more independent, ideational, construct.  The author 
indicated that the ideational theories posit that culture is created in the minds of 
employees.  Conversely, Keesing noted that the sociocultural theories suggest culture is 
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generated in the environment, through interpersonal behaviors and corporate 
circumstances (Keesing, 1974 as cited in Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). 
	  
Allaire & Firsirotu	  
Allaire & Firsirotu (1984) also provided a detailed explanation of culture, which 
worked to combine and explain previous conceptualizations. The authors noted that 
organizational culture is composed of three interconnected components: the sociocultural 
system, the cultural system, and the individual actors.  Allaire and Firsirotu explained 
that the sociocultural system refers to the official structures and policies of a work 
environment.  They provided examples of a corporation’s goals, job hierarchy and 
management procedures.  The cultural system was described as an organization’s 
“expressive and affective dimension in a system of shared meaningful symbols 
manifested in myths, ideology and values” (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). They noted that 
the cultural system is influenced by the environment in which an organization exists (e.g. 
history, society, economy).  The individual actors category refers to the employees of an 
organization, who actively interpret and influence the culture.  Allaire and Firsirotu noted 
that employees are particularly significant because their interpretations of events lead to 
the development of culture.  Allaire and Firsirotu went further to explain that each of the 
categorizations of culture interact and influence one another (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984).   
Schein 	  
Schein, (2004) also worked to condense the literature by describing culture in 
three interacting levels.  The first level, Artifacts refers to the observable characteristics 
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of an organization. This includes the language used, the facilities, the dress code, and any 
other tangible quality that can be quickly observed.  The second level, espoused beliefs 
and values, describes shared ideas of people working within the organization.  As a 
company grows and overcomes challenges, its employees learn from the growth and 
develop long lasting values and beliefs.  The third level, labeled underlying assumptions, 
refers to core assumptions that are universally supported within a corporation.  Schein 
explained that these assumptions are supported so often that employees are unable to 
consider a different thinking pattern (Schein, 2004).  
 The models presented by Keesing, Allaire and Firsirotu, and Schein are important 
in understanding the challenge of describing corporate culture.  Each author struggled to 
provide an all-inclusive explanation of culture, while simultaneously providing specific 
details that maintain the integrity of the construct.  The difficulty inherent in describing 
corporate culture lies in the need to honor the breadth of the topic while upholding a level 
of specificity that maintains the construct’s significance (Coffey, 2010).  Definitions that 
are too broad run the risk of missing the particular characteristics of culture.  
Examinations that are too narrow miss the larger picture.  Many researchers have 
attempted to produce an accurate explanation of corporate culture.  However, it is clear 
that limitations can be found in each proposed definition.  For a review of recent 
definitions of corporate culture please see Table 1.  
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Table 1                           Definitions of Corporate Culture 
 
Definition Author(s) 
‘the totality of the learned and shared patterns of 
belief and behavior of a human group.’ 
(Aceves & King, 1978) 
‘learned behavior copied from one another.’ (Steadman, 1982) 
‘the way we do things around here.’ (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) 
‘means that total body of tradition borne by a 
society and transmitted from generation to 
generation.  It thus refers to the norms, values and 
standards by which the people act, and it includes 
the way distinctive in each society of ordering the 
world and making it intelligible.   
(Murphy, 1986) 
‘the patterned behavior and mental constructs that 
individuals learn, are taught, and share within the 
context of the group to which they belong.’  
(Whitten, & Hunter, 1987) 
‘a set of shared ideals, values, and standards of 
behavior; it is the common denominator that makes 
the actions of individuals intelligible to the group.’ 
(Haviland, 1993) 
‘in its most basic form is an understanding of “the 
way we do things around here.”  Culture is the 
powerful yet ill-defined conceptual thinking within 
the organization that expresses organizational 
values, ideals, attitudes and beliefs.’ 
(Cunningham & Greso, 1994) 
‘consists of “learned systems of meaning, 
communicated by means of natural language and 
other symbol systems, having representational, 
directive, and affective functions, and capable of 
creating cultural entities and particular senses of 
reality.”’ 
(D’Andrade, 1996) 
‘the learned patterns of behavior and thought 
characteristic of a societal group.’ 
(Harris, 2004) 
‘We will restrict the term culture to an ideational 
system.  Cultures in this sense comprise systems of 
shared ideas, systems of concepts and rules and 
meanings that underlie and are expressed in the 
ways that humans live. Culture, so defined, refers to 
what humans learn, not what they do and make.’ 
(Kessing & Strathern, 1998) 
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‘the set of learned behaviors, beliefs, attitudes, 
values, and ideals that are characteristic of a 
particular society or population.’ 
(Ember & Ember, 2001) 
‘All aspects of human adaptation, including 
technology, traditions, language, and social roles.  
Culture is learned and transmitted from one 
generation to the next by nonbiological means.’ 
(Jurmain et al., 2000) 
(As described in Coffey, 2006) 
  
 When reviewing the different conceptualizations of corporate culture, it is clear 
that commonalities exist throughout.  Specifically, the terms ‘thoughts,’ ‘beliefs,’ 
‘meaning,’ ‘values,’ ‘learning,’ and ‘behavior’ are repeatedly mentioned.  However, the 
definitions undoubtedly hold distinct differences.  Many focus on behavior and norms, 
while others center on personal ideals.  Each characterization describes an aspect of 
culture, but there is no single description that combines the critical components of each 
definition.  
Proposed Model of Corporate Culture 
In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, the current project aspired to develop 
a measure of corporate culture that combined major themes of previous instruments.  
Specifically, culture was described as the sum of the Values, Meaning systems and 
Behavioral expectations that exist within a corporation.  Each domain was anticipated to 
hold an equal role in the assessment of corporate culture.  
Many of the aforementioned measures of corporate culture hold a values or beliefs 
component.  For the current project, this domain was designed to address the basic moral 
expectations that employees use to assess daily events.  The assessment of values is 
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important because they have been shown to motivate and influence behavior 
(Verplanken, & Holland, 2002).  
 The Meaning systems category was intended to describe the underlying mental 
constructions that influence an employee’s perception of how events fit into their 
personal narrative.  Meaning systems are very challenging to assess.  However, the 
abstract construct is considered a central component of organizational culture.  The way 
an individual interprets their personal narrative has a significant role in their behaviors, 
affect and psychological well-being (Frankl, 1963; Ryff, 1989).    
The Behavior domain was included because it is an easily measured construct that 
can provide clues about the characteristics of the ultimate culture.  Many current culture 
scales include behavior-related domains.  This feature is significant because it reflects the 
more tangible aspects of corporate culture. A pictorial representation of the author’s 
model of corporate culture can be seen in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1       Model of Corporate Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
The value of the proposed model lies in integration of shared meaning systems.  
To this author’s knowledge, meaning systems have been considered by numerous 
researchers (D’Andrade, 1996; Geertz 1973; Kessing & Strathern, 1998), but never 
considered as part of a global model alongside values and behavioral expectations.   
Typically, meaning (D’Andrade, 1996; Geertz 1973; Kessing & Strathern, 1998) 
and values (Aceves & King, 1978; Cunningham & Gresso, 1994; Murphy, 1986) are 
considered in unassociated models or in a single model as one catch-all factor.  It is 
Culture	  
Behavior	  
Values	  Meaning	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possible that researchers reject the simultaneous inclusion of both constructs in an effort 
to avoid redundancy. This is seen as a critical mistake.  Though meaning and values are 
related, they refer to distinct human experiences.  The inclusion of shared meaning 
systems and values along with behavioral expectations makes the current model of 
corporate culture unique, and more comprehensive than earlier conceptualizations of 
culture.  The subsequent sections will describe each of these three domains and explain 
the related work of previous researchers.    
Hypothesized Domains 
Meaning Systems  
Researchers believe all humans carry unique cognitive orienting systems (global 
meaning systems) that influence the way they understand themselves, interpret 
experiences and develop self-perceptions.  These orienting systems are created over time, 
as individuals continually identify patterns and themes in daily events (Park	  and	  Folkman,	  1997).  This process has strong implications in the occupational setting.  
Employees enter the work environment with preexisting orienting systems.  However, 
these meaning systems are eventually modified to fit the work environment.  If all 
employees experience events at work in a similar way, they develop similar meaning 
systems.  In this project, these common meaning systems are identified as “shared 
meaning systems.”     
The development and impact of shared meaning systems may be best described in 
the following hypothetical example.  If a male employee is raised in a misogynistic 
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family, he may consider men to be better workers than women.  At work, if a female 
coworker is praised for her impressive work ethic and attention to detail, the male’s 
preexisting meaning system will be challenged.  If the work environment consistently 
validates the skill of women, he will be forced to adjust his global meaning system over 
time.  This will change the way the male employee perceives himself and his female 
counterparts.  This will lead him to interact more genuinely with his female peers.  If 
other employees have a similar experience, a shared meaning system that reflects a 
feminist ideology will develop. 
In the above example, the change in the shared meaning system improves gender 
cohesion and likely increases productivity.  Due to the power of meaning systems, many 
researchers have considered the value of the meaning in culture research.  The 
perspectives of Clifford Geertz, and Karl Weick are discussed below. 	  
Clifford Geertz 
Clifford Geertz was well known for describing culture as an ordered system of 
meaning.  Geertz’s explained that every aspect of human existence is controlled and 
supported by an underlying meaning.  He believed this fundamental meaning system was 
the totality of culture.  Geertz’s accepted the difficulty of studying meaning/culture, and 
suggested that the construct be evaluated through a review of artifacts.  Geertz noted that 
artifacts of existence, such as human relationships, celebrations, and accomplishments, 
survive as observable indicators of meaning/culture. (Geertz, 1973; Haukelid, 2008).  
 
 
27	  	  
Karl Weick 	  
 Karl Weick believes meaning making is a central process in all business practices.  
In his 1995 publication, Sensemaking in Organizations, Weick noted that the human 
process of sense making, defined as a human practice of assigning meaning to 
experience, repeatedly occurs in organizations.  The author posited that any event which 
transpires within an organization becomes framed in a context of meaning as employees 
continually appraise their physical surroundings and social environments in an effort to 
understand a global purpose.  Weick suggested that this meaning making process is not 
passive.  In addition to finding meaning as they are confronted by daily events, 
employees also consider a universal meaning as they actively make short and long-term 
decisions (Weick, 1995). 	  
Values	  
The importance of the values construct is two fold.  First, the operation of a large 
organization is dependent on the reliable behavior of employees presenting with varied 
histories and experiences.  In order for a diverse group of people to successfully connect 
with each other and with the company, they must hold similar values and beliefs.  This 
connection and similar focus is central to culture.  Second, values are known to directly 
influence behavior (Schien, 2004).  The control of employee behavior is often an ultimate 
goal of corporate executives.  In fact, culture is important because it is known to 
influence behavior.  Because values are seen as a strong link between culture and 
behavior.  The study of values has been a central component of many culture projects. 
The views of Edgar Schein and Benjamin Schneider are briefly outlined below.  
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Edgar Schein  
 Edgar Schein (2004) describes culture as a pattern of shared beliefs that are 
developed and learned as a company overcomes periods of difficulty.  When confronted 
with challenges, a group must prevail, or fall short.  Companies that prevail find value in 
their achievements and develop a culture that supports successful behaviors.  When new 
members join the organization, they are quickly taught previously successful approaches 
to thinking, feeling and behaving.  Conversely, companies that do not overcome 
challenges are not likely to duplicate the negative behavior.  As a result, they do not 
develop a strong culture.  Schein notes that this understanding of culture explains why 
changing culture is difficult.  Companies that have found success, are not likely to 
abandon a culture of success for untried approaches to business (Schein, 2004).  
Benjamin Schneider  
 Benjamin Schneider shared that culture is best defined as a system of beliefs.  In 
1975, the author explained that the structure of an organization is valuable because it 
influences the way employees perceive their roles.  It changes their perspective and 
adjusts their belief systems (Schneider, 1975).  In 1996, Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo 
discussed the connection between beliefs, values and culture.  The authors explained that 
“a good way to think about the culture of an organization…is to focus on what the people 
in the organization worship.”  They share that this focus on worship points to the 
corporation’s values and beliefs, which are created by culture (Schneider, Brief, & 
Guzzo, 1996).  
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Behavioral Expectations	  
Researchers are interested in the study of culture because they believe the 
construct has the power to influence behavior.  They are invested in the enhancement of 
employee performance.  The relationship between behavior and culture suggests that 
behavioral expectation is a component of culture.  In addition to being a desired outcome 
variable, behavior is closely related to both meaning systems and values.  
Humans are thought to seek congruence between their values and systems of 
meaning, and their behaviors.  Consequently, behaviors are heavily influenced by these 
constructs (Schein, 2004; Weick, 1995).  For example, individuals that value fidelity are 
less likely to cheat on their partners.  Similarly, people that find meaning in their physical 
fitness are more likely to exercise.  The significance of behavior is well known in the 
study of culture.  Since behavior can be easily observed and quantified, its influence has 
been evaluated by numerous investigators.  Below, the views of Marvin Harris, and 
Terrance Deal and Allan Kennedy are highlighted.   
Marvin Harris  
 Marvin Harris rejects the notion that culture must be interpreted as a collection of 
values or meaning systems, or any other learned categorization.  In fact, the author 
reports that these additional considerations complicate the study of culture.  Harris states 
that culture should only be seen from a behavioral perspective.  “The culture concept 
comes down to behavior patterns associated with particular groups of peoples, that is, to 
“customs,” or to “people’s way of life” (Harris, 2001).  In this way, Harris worked to 
simplify the study of culture.  As an anthropologist, Harris supports his perspective by 
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explaining that for years, anthropologists have thoroughly studied culture without 
consideration for values, and meaning (Harris, 2001; Harris, 2004).       
Terrance Deal & Allan Kennedy  
Terrance Deal & Allan Kennedy are well know for describing corporate culture as 
“the way we do things around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Schein, 2004).  Though the 
authors explain that culture is an ethereal construct that involves meaning, values, and 
beliefs, they report that culture is best understood through an assessment of behavior. For 
example, they argue that a company’s rituals and ceremony’s can provide outstanding 
insight into the company’s culture.  Deal and Kennedy take interest in how members of a 
company behave on a continual basis and how they interact during celebrations.  They 
provide an example of physicians washing their hands for seven minutes prior to surgery.  
This ritual is unnecessary as germs are eliminated after 30 seconds of scrubbing.  The 
authors explain that this routine procedure reveals a culture focused on safety (Deal & 
Kennedy, 1983).   
In addition to focusing on celebrations and rituals, Deal and Kennedy suggest that 
culture can be identified through an evaluation of a corporation’s heroes and heroines.  
Most companies have employees or executives that are idolized as the perfect employee.  
A review of these individuals’ behaviors can help illuminate the culture of the company.  
As an example, Deal and Kennedy point to IBM’s Tom Watson and GE’s Charles 
Steinmetz, both of whom passed away long ago.  Each of these individuals remain highly 
regarded in their respective companies, as currently employees continue to emulate there 
behaviors (Deal & Kennedy, 1983). 
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Corporate Safety Culture 
Creating a model of corporate culture is important because it informs the 
assessment process.  With effective measurement, executives can evaluate their 
companies, identify any weaknesses in culture, and make necessary changes. The ability 
to identify limitations in operation is significant for any organization, but it is especially 
important in companies working in high risk industries.  Companies working in high-risk 
industries, including mining, agriculture (fishing and forestry), construction, 
transportation, wholesale trade and manufacturing, are constantly concerned with safety 
related issues (Katz-Navon, Navah, & Stern, 2005).  For companies in these industries, a 
strong corporate safety culture is of paramount importance.  
Empirical research validates an interest in safety culture, as investigators have 
shown repeatedly that a robust culture of safety significantly reduces the overall risk of 
workplace accidents.  For example, in 1997 Judith Erikson completed a nationwide study 
on the impact of corporate culture on safety performance.  Using a survey to evaluate the 
perceptions of employees, Erikson showed that when an organization’s management 
team works to implement a culture of safety,  safety performance and employee health 
improve (Erickson, 1997).  
These results were corroborated by Shannon, Mayr and Haines, (1997) who 
reviewed the conclusions of ten studies that evaluated the connection between safety and 
workplace factors.  The authors’ analysis was comprehensive, as each study included in 
the review had assessed at least 20 separate occupational settings. Shannon, Mayr and 
Haines identified work place factors that were significantly correlated with injury rates.  
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The significant factors fell under the following 4 headings: 1) Joint health and safety 
committees, 2) Management style and culture, 3) Organizational philosophy, and 4) 
workforce characteristics.  The authors synthesized the results by identifying variables 
that were significantly correlated with injury rates in at least 66% of the reviewed studies.  
Safety culture and management style, though influential in each of the assessed factors, 
was explicitly shown to be a significant predictor of reduced injury rates in 100% of the 
studies evaluating this relationship.  
In 2002, Michael O’Toole added to the literature by evaluating a large mining and 
construction firm that altered its approach to safety in the year prior to the data collection.  
The firm had made a change from a culture “driven by compliance to one driven by doing 
the right thing to prevent accidents and injuries to employees”( O’Toole, 2002).  By 
evaluating the employees’ perceptions of the management’s devotion to safety, and 
recording accident rates over a two year period, the author was able to identify a trend of 
safety.  Specifically, the subject company experienced a significant reduction in their 
OSHA Lost Time Injury Rate.  O’Toole, suggested that the decline in injury rates were 
directly related to the company’s shift in safety culture (O’Toole, 2002). 
Theoretical Perspectives of Safety Culture 
As a characteristic of corporate culture, the construct of corporate safety culture 
carries the same weaknesses.  Researchers greatly value the construct, but differences in 
conceptualization and theory prevent the development of a universally supported 
definition of the construct.  This theme was shown in Guldenund’s (2000) review of 
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safety culture and safety climate definitions.  The author identified seven published 
definitions of safety culture, all of which were slightly different (Guldenund, 2000).  
Significantly, the variation in the reviewed definitions matched the range of factors 
suggested in the current project’s model of corporate culture.    
Specifically, three definitions centered around values: a) “the attitudes, beliefs, 
perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety” (Cox, & Cox, 1991), 
b) “Set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices” (Pidgeon, 
1991), c) “Assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals” 
(International safety Advisory group, 1991).  Two focused on behavior : a) The concept 
that the organization’s beliefs and attitudes are manifested in actions, policies, and 
procedures (Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, & Kaplan, 1993),  b) The product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior (Lee, 1996).  
Finally, two definitions pointed to the importance of meaning systems: a) “Everyone feels 
responsible for safety and pursues it on a daily basis (Geller, 1994), b) “the collective 
mental programming towards safety of a group of organization members (Berends, 
1996). 
Measurement of Corporate Culture 
 Given the allusive nature of corporate culture, it is no surprise that measurement 
of the construct is limited by methodological inconsistencies.  As researchers attempt to 
measure corporate culture, they are confronted by significant challenges.  To start, they 
must support a single conceptualization.  As was previously mentioned, this process can 
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be very difficult as the diverse theoretical perspectives have led to a proliferation of 
various conceptualizations of corporate culture.   
After choosing a theoretical position, researchers must select between qualitative 
and quantitative measurements.  This is a highly debated issue in the study of corporate 
culture.  Many researchers advocate for quantitative measurement through the use of 
questionnaires.  This approach to measurement is valued because it allows for the quick 
and cost-effective assessment of sizable groups of people (Guldenmund, 2007).  When 
working with large corporations, self administered questionnaire save resources.  The 
same questionnaire can be completed simultaneously by numerous participants and 
quickly scored by a single investigator.  Moreover, this approach encourages a high level 
of consistency in scoring.  When using choice-limited response formats, subjective 
interpretation is eliminated.  Another benefit of quantitative measurement is the ability to 
acquire instant results, which can allow researchers to “produce medians or means, 
compare subgroups and benchmark these” (Guldenmund, 2007).  
Despite the advantages of quantitative measurement, many corporate culture 
experts support the use of qualitative assessments (Guldenmund, 2007; Denison, 1996). 
Guldenmund (2007) explained that the use of surveys is problematic because corporate 
culture is a construct that is shared by employees.  The author noted that  
“in survey research, one is caught between the theoretical demands of 
statistics (heterogeneous normally distributed variables around a single 
mean obtained from a large population) and the theoretical requirements 
of culture ([strong] convictions shared by groups or categories of people, 
which are small enough to interact and create a culture about safety or any 
other related topic)” (Guldenmund, 2007). 
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More simply stated, statistical theory requires a large and diverse sample that comes in 
opposition to corporate culture, which is created in smaller, homogeneous populations.  
Guldenmund’s reservations about the use of quantitative methods have been 
echoed by other investigators, who believe quantitative surveys do not accurately assess 
the culture.  These researchers argue that surveys usually address characteristics, 
behaviors, and feelings associated with an organization.  However, they do not consider 
the participant’s underlying values and meaning systems.  Essentially, most current 
culture assessments measure climate, as opposed to culture (Denison, 1996; Mearns, 
Whitaker, & Flin, 2001).  
Culture Measurements Evaluated 
 Because the logistical advantages of quantitative measurement (time, money, 
ease) are overwhelming, the purpose of the present project is to design an effective 
survey-based quantitative measurement tool.  The aspiration to develop a successful 
quantitative measure of corporate safety culture is important because very few measures 
of corporate culture and corporate safety culture exist. Those that are available for use are 
theoretically limited and statistically weak.  The following section describes the most 
well-known corporate culture and corporate safety culture surveys. This review is 
intended to inform the development of a new theory-based measure that more accurately 
assesses safety culture.   
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Organizational Culture Inventory	  
 The Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) is a measure designed to evaluate a 
corporation’s work-related behavioral norms across 12 organizational styles.  120 items 
are used to assess the expectations across the following categories: “humanistic-
encouraging, affinitive, approval, conventional, dependent, avoidance, oppositional, 
power, competitive, perfectionistic, achievement, and self actualizing” (Alexander, 
1990). The OCI is considered a unique test because it purports to measure a participant’s 
interpretation of their company’s culture, as opposed to the participant’s own thoughts 
and behaviors.  This difference in focus is believed to decrease personal bias and thus 
make the measure more valid.  
 In addition to evaluating the style characteristics of the assessed corporation, the 
OCI also identifies the corporation’s culture across the following culture categories: 
Constructive, Passive/defensive, and Aggressive/Defensive.  The results of the culture 
categorization are used to provide information about the reviewed organizations’ 
strengths and weakness.  Specifically positive outcomes are associated with constructive 
cultures, while negative results are said to be related to the passive/defensive and 
aggressive/defensive categories.  The conclusions of the measure are cataloged in a 
culture profile that is easy for a consumer to review and understand (Alexander, 1990).  
The validity of these outcomes, with respect to organizational safety, are indeed unknown 
(Alexander, 1990).   
The OCI appears to have two major strengths.  First, the test evaluates the 
perceived culture of the company, as opposed each individual participant’s personal 
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thoughts and behaviors.  Second, the test produces a comprehensive explanation of a 
studied company’s culture profile, which can be used help the company’s executives 
improve upon their organization.   
That said, the measure holds several limitations.  First, the test creators have not 
published any clear findings associated with the reliability or validity of the measure. 
This lack of statistical support drastically limits the value of the measure.  Similarly, no 
explanation is provided regarding the selection of the three culture clusters or the 12 style 
categories.  It is unknown if these groupings have theoretical underpinnings.  
Denison organizational culture survey  
 The Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) was developed by Denison, 
a consulting firm based in Ann Arbor Michigan.  Denison is well-known for their 
specialization in executive coaching, corporate culture assessment and corporate culture 
improvement.  The foundation for all of Denison’s work is the “Denison Model,”  a 
conceptual model of an organization’s cultural-based characteristics. The company 
reports that each of the Denison Model’s four global characteristics, (Mission, 
Adaptability, Involvement and Consistency) must be maximized for a company to 
operate effectively.  Within each general characteristic, the Denison model includes three 
trait indicators.  Specifically, the Mission trait is indicated by: strategic direction and 
intent, goals and objectives, and vision. The Adaptability characteristic is designated by: 
creating change, customer focus, and organizational learning.  The Involvement quality is 
composed of: empowerment, team orientation and capability development.  Finally, the 
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Consistency trait is indicated by: core values, agreement, coordination and integration 
(Denison, 2010). 
 The DOCS is used to evaluate the 12 separate indices, which are measured via 60 
items.  After the test has been completed by employees of a reviewed organization, the 
scores are aggregated and compared to the norming sample. A final report provides 
percentile scores, which show the percentage of the organizations in the normative group 
that scored lower than the reviewed organization. With this information, an executive 
team can make informed decisions about their corporation’s culture (Denison, 2010). 
 The DOCS clearly has many positive qualities.  Perhaps most significant is the 
applicability of the model for companies working in diverse settings.  The consulting 
company has experience using the test with over 1000 organizations operating in 
numerous industries. The results of the test are comprehensive and easy to understand. 
The limitations of this measure fall on its conceptual foundation.  Although the Denison 
Model completely describes organizational characteristics, only one of the indices 
(values) addresses corporate culture.  With this foundation, the DOCS seem to be more of 
a climate survey than a culture survey.  It is also important to note that, to this author’s 
knowledge, Denison has not published any data regarding the DOCS’s reliability or 
validity.   
Safety Culture Measures Evaluated 
Many researchers use general organizational culture surveys without considering 
industry characteristics.  It is clear, that the previously described surveys contain no 
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reference of safety culture.  This is problematic because safety culture carries industry-
specific characteristics.  Accordingly, it is likely the construct is best measured by safety 
culture inventories.  The following section will discuss the three most commonly used 
safety culture instruments.  
Safety Culture Survey (SCS) 	  
 The Safety Culture Survey (SCS) was designed by Safety Performance Solutions 
(SPS), a consulting organization that specializes in helping other companies acquire a 
“Total Safety Culture.”  SPS explains that a total safety culture requires the identification 
of barriers to safety performance.  Accordingly, SPS created the SCS to act as a tool for 
the discovery of cultural characteristics that thwart safety performance.  The SCS is 
specifically designed to evaluate employee’s perceptions of a reviewed company’s safety 
culture.  It is a 93-item measure, which questions employees about numerous aspects of 
the current safety culture: 1) management support for safety, 2) peer support for safety, 3) 
personal responsibility, 4) discipline, 5) incident reporting and analysis, 6) safety rules, 
regulations, and procedures, 7) training, 8) safety suggestions and concerns, 9) rewards 
and recognition, 10) safety audits and inspections, 11) communication, 12) employee 
engagement, 13) safety meetings and committees, 14) miscellaneous (Safety Performance 
Solutions, 2010). 
 Once completed, the results of the SCS are compiled and compared to the 
norming sample. Currently, the SCS carries a norming sample of approximately 200,000 
employees from hundreds of companies that have previously utilized the measure.  This 
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enables SPS to accurately describe a company’s current safety culture performance 
(Safety Performance Solutions, 2010). 
 The SCS is a strong assessment that has been normed on a very large sample.  It is 
user-friendly and easy to interpret.  The greatest strength of the survey lies in its domains.  
With 14 separate domains, this test considers a large range of company characteristics.  
Although the SCS carries many strengths, it is also limited in its evaluation of culture.  
The extensive domain list is designed to assess a company’s current safety environment, 
which best fits the definition of climate.  There are no domains that directly address 
meaning or values.  
Safety Culture Values and Practices Questionnaire (QCS) 
 The QCS is an intricate measure that uses a double-pronged approach to assess 
corporate safety culture.  First, QSC uses a competing values framework to describe a 
reviewed organization’s orientation towards safety.  This process ranks the organization 
across the following values: human relation or support, open system or innovation, 
internal process or rules and rational goals or goal models. The test creators explain that 
each of these orientations exist within all companies, but the different degrees of their 
presences can provide insight into the safety of the organization (Diaz-Cabrera, 
Hernandez-Fernaud, & Esla-Diaz, 2007). 
In addition to identifying a reviewed company’s orientation towards safety, the 
QSC also evaluates an organization’s safety practices across seven dimensions.  The 
seven dimensions are described as foundational components of safety culture.  The 
dimensions are: 1) training program content, 2) incident and accident reporting systems, 
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3) orientation of safety rules and procedure, 4) performance appraisal and safety 
promotion strategies, 5) motivation patterns used, 6) information and communication 
systems, and 7) leadership styles (Diaz-Cabrera, Hernandez-Fernaud, & Esla-Diaz, 
2007). 
The strength of the QCS lies in its detailed approach to safety.  By evaluating a 
company’s culture, in addition to dimensions of safety, the measure endeavors to provide 
a comprehensive view of a given organization’s safety orientations.  However, the 
limitation of this measure is found in the specific categories of culture.  The QCS’s 
competing values framework provides insight into the level of value within an 
organization.  However, the specific categories do not present a full picture of culture.  
The domains are very specific, ignoring the role of meaning and focusing largely on  
tangible aspects of the corporate climate. 
Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System	  
 The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS) is a safety 
culture survey designed for use in high risk industries.  Most recently, the test has been 
widely used in the aviation industry.  The test uses a four-factor  model, including: 1) 
organizational commitment, 2) formal safety indicators, 3) operations interactions, and 4) 
informal safety indicators.  Combined, each of these factors is purported to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of an evaluated organization.  In an effort to increase the 
measurability of the modes, each factor carries three concrete dimensions.  Specifically, 
organizational commitment is composed of: a) safety values, b) safety commitment, and 
c) going beyond compliance.  Formal safety indicators include the following: a) reporting 
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system, b) response and feedback, and c) safety personnel.  Operations interactions 
consist of: a) supervisors/foremen, b) operations control/ancillary operations, and c) 
instructors/training.  Finally, informal safety indicators incorporates: a) accountability, b) 
employee authority, and c) professionalism (Thaden, & Gibbons, 2008). 
In addition to the aforementioned factors of safety culture, the SCISMS also 
carries a correlated factor labeled Safety Behaviors/Outcomes.  The authors use this 
factor, composed of two dimensions: a) perceived personal risk/safety behavior, and b) 
perceived organizational risk, as an outcome measure.  The test creators believe safety 
culture influences both corporate safety behavior, and perceptions of risk (Thaden, & 
Gibbons, 2008). 
The SCISMS is a powerful tool because it has strong empirical foundations, 
which were used to identify the measured domains.  The specific factors are 
comprehensive and measurable through the more-tangible sub-categories.  Moreover, this 
survey carries high internal reliability.  That said, the measure has the same weaknesses 
as each of the previously mentioned surveys.  It evaluates the concrete categories of 
safety, but it is not a measure of culture.  Culture is a subtle construct that includes 
behaviors, values and meaning.  The SCISMS does not measure these aspects of a 
reviewed corporation. 
Need for a new survey	  
 When reviewing the available measures of corporate culture and corporate safety 
culture, it is clear that the current measures are deficient. Only two of the identified 
measures hold a domain of corporate culture.   These measures, the Safety Culture Values 
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and Practices Questionnaire, and the Denison Organizational Culture Survey, are still 
limited in the depth at which it addresses culture.  This review highlights the need for an 
empirically supported measure of corporate safety culture.  A review of the evaluated 
measures can be found in Table 2.  
 
Table 2                              Measures of Safety Culture 
 
Measure Author Dimensions Weakness Evidence 
Organizational 
Culture 
Inventory 
Cooke & 
Lafferty 
(a) Constructive 
(b) Passive/Defensive 
(c)Aggressive/Defensive 
1) Theory 
2) No 
statistical 
support  
no reliability or 
validity data 
Denison 
Organizational 
Culture 
Survey 
Denison 
& Neale 
(a) Mission 
(b) Adaptability 
(c) Involvement 
(d) Consistency 
1) Theory 
(evaluates 
values, but 
no other 
aspect of 
culture) 
2) No 
statistical 
support 
 
no reliability or 
validity data 
Safety Culture 
Survey 
Safety 
Performa
nce 
Solutions 
a) Management support for 
Safety;   
b). Peer Support for Safety; c). 
Personal  Responsibility; d) 
Discipline; e). Incident 
reporting; f) Safety Rules 
Regulations g). Training; h) 
safety Suggestions i) Rewards 
and Recognition; j) Safety 
Audits k) Communication l) 
Engagement m) Safety Meetings 
1) Theory 
(measures 
climate) 
 
No reliability or 
validity data 
Safety Culture 
Values and 
Practices 
Questionnaire 
Diaz-
Cabrera, 
Hernand
ez-
Fernaud, 
& Esla-
Diaz 
 (a) Human Relation or Support,  
(b) Open system or Innovation 
(c) Internal Process or Rules 
(d) Rational Goal or Goal 
Models 
1) Theory 
(measures 
values, but 
no other 
aspect of 
culture) 
 
No reliability or 
validity data 
Safety Culture 
Indicator Scale 
Measurement 
System 
Thaden 
& 
Gibbons 
(a)Organizational Commitment 
(b) Formal  Safety Indicators 
(c) Operations Interactions 
(d) Informal Safety Indicators 
1) Theory 
(measures 
climate) 
 
Alpha 
coefficients 
=.81-.95 
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A review of the literature does not uncover a complete or comprehensive measure 
of corporate culture or corporate safety culture.  A perfect measure would include an 
evaluation of each global domain of culture.  To ensure validity, these overarching 
domains would be empirically supported.  In an effort fill the gaps in the literature, the 
current project is designed to develop a measure of corporate safety culture that considers 
the overarching domains of culture. These domains have been identified as: Meaning 
systems, Values, and Behavioral expectations.  To satisfy the need for an empirically 
validated measure, the aforementioned domains will be subjected to statistical tests of 
reliability and validity.   
Analytic Methodology 
 The purpose of this project is to create a valid and reliable quantitative measure of 
corporate safety culture.  In the modern statistical era, researchers have the ability to use 
many different statistical techniques when designing measurement tools.  The following 
section will discuss the benefits of factor analysis and explain the difference between 
exploratory and confirmatory analyses.  
Factor Analysis	  
 Factor analysis is an approach to test construction that was initiated by Charles 
Spearman in 1904 as a tool to aid in intelligence test development. (Spearman, 1904 as 
cited in Thompson, 2004).  The difficulty inherent in intelligence test construction lies in 
the numerous dimensions associated with the single concept identified as ‘intelligence’ 
(Gardner, 1999).  Prior to Spearman’s work, the design of intelligence tests was limited.  
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Because researchers were unaware of the particular variables measured by items on 
prospective tests, they had no ability to ensure parsimonious and thorough evaluations.  
Spearman responded to this problem by developing the statistical technique now called 
‘factor analysis’ (Thompson, 2004).     
Factor analysis is a statistical method that allows researchers to identify the latent 
‘factors’ that control or influence the variation in several observed variables (Thompson, 
2004).  For example, a factor analysis of an intelligence test would show that individual 
respondents typically answer questions related to addition, multiplication, subtraction and 
division with similar proficiency.  Questions associated with reading, vocabulary, 
spelling and grammar are separately answered with related skill.   This ‘grouping’ of 
variables, identified through factor analysis, would reveal the existence of two separate 
‘factors.’  In this example, these latent factors might be math and language respectively.   
Factor analysis is critical to the test construction process as researchers are often 
unaware of the underlying factor structure.  Grouping the variables allows investigators 
to develop theories and better understand measured constructs.  In the example above, the 
researcher would learn that ‘intelligence’ holds the factors of language and a math.  
Factor analysis is also beneficial in test construction because it helps researchers identify 
and improve the validity of a measure.  By grouping variables that are answered 
similarly, factor analysis highlights the items that ‘load together’ and simultaneously 
draws attention to the items that do not.  Items that load together are believed to have an 
identifiable commonality (Devellis, 1991). This commonality is believed to validate the 
existence of an underlying factor.  Conversely, items that do not load with other items do 
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not validate the presence of important factors.  Instead, they appear uninfluenced by 
underlying factors and reduce the validity of the test.  By removing these isolated items, a 
test creator can improve the validity of a measure (Thompson, 2004).    
Exploratory Factor Analysis vs. Confirmatory Factor Analysis	  
Two main forms of factor analysis exist: exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  EFA is the original and most common form of 
factor analysis.  It does not necessitate any theoretical assumptions or factor-related 
expectations.  EFA allows latent factors to be identified through unbiased statistical 
analysis.  EFA is most useful when researchers are interested in learning more about a 
given construct and do not have solid theory regarding potential factors (Devellis, 1991; 
Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003).   
CFA on the other hand was more recently developed and requires “specific 
expectation regarding (a) the number of factors, (b) which variables reflect given factors, 
and (c) whether the factors are correlated” (Thompson, 2004).  For researchers with 
theories, CFA is often considered more valuable than EFA because the analysis is 
directed to evaluate the specific theorized factors.  This direct analysis, allows a 
researcher to quantifiably assess the degree of model fit.  In general, CFA produces more 
specific results, though the investigator runs the risk of discovering that the theorize 
model is grossly inaccurate.  When this is the case, the researcher may employ EFA to 
discover the latent factors (Thompson, 2004).  In the present project, both EFA and CFA 
were utilized.  EFA was employed to identify an empirical model and CFA was 
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employed to develop a experimental model.  CFA was then utilized to compare the fit of 
identified models. 
Outcome Measurement	  
In addition to developing a measure of corporate safety culture, this study also 
endeavored to evaluate the value and importance of the survey.  To assess the 
relationship between the measure and safety behavior, an outcome variable of behavioral 
frequency was assessed.  This was challenging because, to this author’s knowledge, there 
were no preexisting measures of safety behavior. Without a validated preexisting test, the 
most efficient way to measure behavioral frequency as an outcome variable was to assess 
a single behavioral frequency item with high face validity.  The use of untested items to 
assess an outcome raised some methodological questions.  It was possible that the 
assessed question was invalid, thus limiting the accuracy of the outcome assessment.   
Despite these important concerns, extant research reveals that the use of new, 
simple, face valid questions, can be used to assess research outcomes.  Due to the high 
level of face validity, there is little question about the items’ applicability to assessed 
outcomes.  The following section shows a precedent in test creation literature of the use 
of this methodological practice.    
In a study similar to the present project, Toll, O’Malley, McKee, Salovey, and 
Krishnan-Sarin (2007) designed a measure of nicotine withdrawal.  The authors used 
CFA to validate the Minnesota Nicotine Withdrawl Scale.  In an effort to add validity to 
the scale, Toll et al. used an outcome measure of smoking behaviors.  They did not have a 
previously created and validated measure of smoking outcomes.  Instead, they designed a 
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behavioral frequency scale, which assessed for smoking frequency (“are you smoking?”).  
The use of this binary outcome scale is very similar to the methodology used in the 
current study, as a similarly objective question was asked: “Did you receive a 
performance documentation form for using good safety practices during the past 12 
months?” (Toll, et. al., 2007).  
In a comparable project, Witte et. al. designed a measure of suicide risk.  After 
using EFA and CFA to identify the factor structure, the authors evaluated the new 
measure’s predictive validity.  To test validity, Witte et. al. asked binary questions: 1) 
“Since you called the crisis center, have you tried to kill yourself?” 2) “Have you had any 
thoughts of killing yourself since you called the crisis line?” These items had not been 
validated, and were used as outcome measures.  
In a unique study, Vitacco and Kosson (2010) validated a measure of 
interpersonal psychopathology through the use of EFA and CFA.  To gain predictive 
validity, the researchers compared scores on the created test to antisocial personality 
disorder symptoms (ASPD).  The authors did not use a validated measure to assess 
ASPD.  Instead, they used a demographic questionnaire and a semi-structured interview.  
Although this study does not use a new behavioral frequency scale, it shows that in the 
development of a measure, it is acceptable to use outcomes measures that are not 
validated (Vitacco & Kosson, 2010).  It is believed that the diagnosis of ASPD through 
interview is more subjective and less reliable than an evaluation of behavioral frequencies 
through a fact-based face valid question.   
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Summary 
This chapter distinguished between the concepts of corporate culture and 
corporate climate.  The value of corporate culture and corporate safety culture was 
discussed.  The state of corporate culture theory was exposed.  A new model of corporate 
culture was proposed with Meaning systems, Values, and Behavioral Expectations as the 
fundamental factors.  Current corporate culture and corporate safety culture measures 
were described.  Limitations of content were identified in each measure.  Finally, 
exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis was described and evaluation 
of an outcome measure was discussed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The present study was designed to create and validate a comprehensive measure 
of corporate safety culture.  This chapter describes the methodology that was used in the 
development of the Corporate Safety Culture Scale (CSCS).  It includes an explanation of 
the planning, construction, evaluation, and validation of the instrument.  
Research Design 
 The project used factor analysis and structural equation modeling to design and 
evaluate the CSCS.  Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to develop an empirical 
model.  Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was employed to present the experimental 
model, containing the predicted components: Meaning systems, Values, and Behavioral 
expectations.  The model fit of each developed model was assessed and compared.  After 
identifying the model with best fit, the researcher used a one-way between groups 
analysis of variance to appraise the relationship between safety behavior and scores on 
the CSCS. 
Planning 
 The development of the CSCS was important because current measures of 
corporate safety culture are limited in their theoretical foundations.  Theorists have used 
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myriad definitions to describe corporate culture and corporate safety culture.  When 
reviewing the current definitions, several themes are apparent.  Specifically, there is often 
reference to employee behavior, values, and shared meanings.  Though there seems to be 
some agreement on the importance of these constructs, no single definition of corporate 
culture includes each of these factors.  The development of a theory-based test is also 
significant because only two identified measures of corporate safety culture are shown to 
have a theoretical foundation.  These measures, the Safety Culture Values and Practices 
Questionnaire and the Denison Organizational Culture Survey, each hold only one of the 
aforementioned factors of corporate culture.   
 Based on the limitations of the existing theories and related measures, the purpose 
of the current project was to develop a more successful measure of corporate safety 
culture.  In an effort to honor the themes of previous definitions, the present study’s 
description of corporate culture holds that culture is the sum of organizations’ shared 
meanings, values, and behavioral expectations.  
Participants	  
  Organization	  
Approximately 41% of all workplace accidents occur during periods of 
transportation (U.S. Department of Labor, 2010).  It is evident that within the 
transportation industry safety culture is extremely important.  Due to the significance of 
safety in transportation, participants for the current project were recruited from the 
Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT).   
The Colorado Department of Transportation is a state-run organization that 
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manages public transportation within Colorado.  The CDOT website reports that the 
organization manages over “28 billion vehicle miles of travel” annually in the state of 
Colorado.  Along with controlling the 9144 mile Interstate system, bridges and smaller 
roads, CDOT also supports other forms of transportation, including aviation, within 
Colorado.  Additionally, the department of transportation assists local law enforcement 
agencies as they work to improve safe traveling behaviors (Colorado Department of 
Transportation, 2011).   
From its inception in 1991, CDOT has placed great importance on safety.  The 
value of safety is revealed in the company’s mission statement: “To provide the best 
multi-modal transportation system for Colorado that most effectively and safely moves 
people, goods, and information.”  To emphasize their desire for a low incident rate, 
CDOT lists safety as the first of their six core values (Colorado Department of 
Transportation, 2011).   
Because safety is critically important to CDOT, the executive team responded 
strongly when, in 2009, researchers produced a report on CDOT’s behalf indicating that 
the organization recorded more incidents than similar public transportation departments 
and comparable private organizations (Chinowsky, & Hallowell, 2009).  In an effort to 
evaluate the safety-related climate at CDOT, the organization’s safety committee planned 
to administer an internally created safety survey that was completed by CDOT employees 
in 2006 and 2007.  See Appendix C. 
CDOT Recruitment 
53	  	  
The investigator contacted the Colorado Department of Transportation’s training 
academy director, via email.  The director previously worked with the University of 
Denver, and openly noted his interest in corporate culture.  As a result of his interest in 
the topic, the training academy director quickly organized a meeting between, himself, 
the investigator, and a CDOT executive.  In the meeting, the CDOT representatives 
agreed to partner with the investigator on this project in exchange for the results of the 
study, including feedback and recommendations regarding the organization’s safety 
culture.  
 Individuals 
As was previously mentioned, prior to being contacted by the investigator, CDOT 
executives planned to administer a safety climate survey that was completed in 2006 and 
2007.  For the purposes of the present project, CDOT allowed the researcher to add items 
to the previously created measure to create a shorter test within the larger measure.  
Specifically, the CDOT survey held a total of seventy questions, twenty-four of which 
were attributed to the CSCS.  The final version of the survey was electronically 
distributed to all 3,349  CDOT employees. The survey received a strong response rate of 
approximately 57%.  In total 1909 surveys were fully completed. 
Although all CDOT employees were asked to complete the survey, only responses 
provided by a specific group of employees were eligible for analysis as part of the present 
project.  In particular, there were three eligibility requirements for participation in the 
study.  First, in an effort to gain the best perspective on safety, responses provided by 
participants working in high risk positions were evaluated.  Specifically, this included 
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employees working in divisions of transit and rail, and the maintenance division. Second, 
participants did not hold managerial positions within their organizations.  This 
requirement was intended to reduce respondent bias.  It was believed that higher-ranking 
employees would be more invested in the outcomes of the study and more aware of 
efforts made to implement a culture of safety.  Lower ranking employees were thought to 
be less familiar with executive mandates, and thus more likely to accurately describe the 
safety culture of CDOT.  Finally, all evaluated participants were between the ages of 18 
and 65.  This age limitation was important as it allowed the researcher to assess the most 
typical segment of employees working in high-risk industries.  
 Consideration was also given to the participant’s tenure as CDOT employees.  It 
was believed that employees who had been employed for longer periods of time would 
have a better understanding of the corporate safety culture.  However, due to sample size 
necessities, the investigator was unable to exclude employees with limited tenure at 
CDOT.  Please see Table 3 for tenure statistics 
Table 3              Tenure Statistics 
 
Years of Tenure N 
0-5  413 
6-10 203 
11-15 130 
21+ 64 
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Prior to commencement of this project, the researcher anticipated measuring the 
effects of demographic differences amongst the participants.  However the CDOT safety 
committee was unwilling to record demographic information because they deemed the 
information to be unnecessary.  Specifically, they did not allow for the inclusion of 
questions associated with race, ethnicity, gender, age, SES, or education level. The 
researcher was forced to accept this limitation.  With this restriction, the results must be 
interpreted with care.  They likely only generalize to similar state departments of 
transportation.   	  
Construction 
Corporate Safety Culture Scale: Item Pool 
 This study was completed to create a measure of corporate safety culture.  
Several steps were followed in the development of the item pool.  First, the principle 
investigator completed a comprehensive review of the literature.  The extant literature 
clearly revealed fragmented research.  Corporate culture has been understood through 
numerous theoretical positions, which has lead to a significant number of diverse 
instruments.  No single instrument was found to bridge the gap between the different 
theories.   
With the goal of creating a more well-rounded and inclusive instrument, the 
investigator attempted to connect the theories by organizing the research into overarching 
thematic categories.  The following three groupings were identified: shared Meaning 
systems, Values, and Behavioral expectations.  The recognition of three global themes 
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led to the hypothesis that corporate culture is a large construct that is composed of the 
previously mentioned three themes, or factors.  The factors described above are further 
defined in Table 4. 
 
    
Table 4                               Factors of Corporate Culture 
 
Factors Explanation 
Meaning Systems: 
 
Meaning Systems are underlying mental 
constructions that allow for the 
interpretation and understanding of how 
daily events fall into an individual’s 
personal narrative.  
 
Values:  Values represent the fundamental moral 
expectations that an individual uses to 
appraise daily events.  
 
Behavioral Expectations: Behavioral Expectations refers to the 
activities that are anticipated within the 
course of an individual’s employment 
responsibilities.      
 
 
Potential items of the CSCS were developed conceptually, following an attempt to 
create items consistent with the three themes.  The author generated approximately 10 
items per theme.  Then, in conjunction with the dissertation chair the investigator reduced 
the item pool by eliminating unnecessary items.  In total 25 new items were retained, 
with at least 8 items in each domain.  All items were given a six option Likert response 
format with a continuum ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  
Corporate Safety Culture Scale: Cognitive Interviews	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As was recommended by DeVellis (1991), the investigator met with the CDOT 
executive safety committee to ensure applicability of the survey items.  Members of this 
committee held expertise in safety, culture, risk, survey development, and the 
transportation industry.  All members were high ranking CDOT employees.  The 
committee was composed of members holding the following positions within CDOT: 
Training Academy Director-Organizational Psychologist, Maintenance Superintendent, 
Traffic Engineer, Tunnel Superintendent, Risk Management Unit Supervisor, Regional 
Safety Manager, and Maintenance Superintendent.  
 During the meeting, the committee read through and discussed the applicability, 
value, and composition of each item suggested as part of the new measure.  The 
investigator used the recommendations provided by the committee to develop a final 
version of the CSCS.  In total, the measure held twenty-four items.   
Corporate Safety Culture Scale: Expert Review	  
 In an effort to improve the validity of the items, the survey was evaluated by 23 
graduate students at the University of Denver.  The students were asked to assess the 
extent to which each proposed survey item addressed the intended culture domains.  The 
reviewers recorded their evaluations by completing an attached rating form (see 
Appendix B). The form held a definition for each proposed domain, and allowed for each 
item to be rated for relevance to the anticipated components.  
On balance, the evaluators concluded that each of the items was better than a 
“good fit.”  However to ensure that only valid items were used, the investigator 
eliminated all items that were given a mean score that was less than an “excellent fit.”  
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This required the investigator to eliminate 7 items.  With the unsatisfactory items 
eliminated, the final version of the SCSC was identified.  The item pool held 18 items, 
with at least 5 items predicted to load on each proposed domain.  
Quantitative Evaluation 
Procedures 
  The CSCI was administered to all 3,349 CDOT employees.  After the test results 
were gathered, data from non-eligible participants was discarded.  In total, the data 
provided by 907 employees was retained. The investigator started by randomly sorting 
the sample into two groups.  The groups, identified as groups “A” and “B” from here 
forward, each held approximately 50% of the total sample.   
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Group “A” was submitted to an exploratory factor analysis to identify the 
empirical factor structure.  This analysis started with an evaluation of the assumptions. 
The assumptions of sample size, outliers, factorability of the correlation matrix, linearity 
were tested.  The sample was modified to ensure that the expectation of each assumption 
was achieved.   
Principle components analysis was used to reduce the data and identify the most 
robust independent factors. The identification of the empirical model required the 
assessment of Communalities, Eigen values, the pattern matrix, and the Scree Plot.  At 
each step, items shown to diminish the power of factor loadings were removed.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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The second analysis, using group B, started with an appraisal of the assumptions 
of normality and reliability.  Again, the sample was modified to meet the requirements of 
each assumption.  Using Amos software, group B was used to evaluate the model fit of 
the empirical model and the experimental model, composed of the originally theorized 
items and domains.  The investigator completed theoretically supported modifications to 
improve model fit.  Model fit was evaluated and compared using the following fit 
indices:  Chi-squared (χ2), Root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), Bentler 
comparative fit index (CFI), and Expected cross-validation index (ECVI).  
The χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic is a fundamental assessment of model fit.  The 
value evaluates the difference between the “sample and fitted covariance matrices”	  (Hu 
and Bentler, 1999). The null hypothesis holds that there is no significant difference 
between the observed and expected values.  Accordingly a significant χ2 value suggests 
the model does not adequately fit the data (Kline, 2011).  While the χ2 goodness-of-fit 
statistic is an essential value of model fit, it does carry significant limitations.  In 
particular, it is easily skewed by sample size.  In the current project, with group samples 
greater than 400, the χ2 statistic was likely to be significant despite the possibility of only 
minor data discrepancies (Kline, 2011).  
The root-mean-square error of approximation is an absolute fit index that follows 
a non-central χ2 distribution.  It estimates the model parameter’s ability to limit the 
population covariance (Thompson, 2004).  RMSEA is considered a “badness-of-fit index 
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where zero indicates that best fit” (Kline, 2011).  An acceptable RMSEA value is lower 
than, or equal to, .08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) 
The Bentler comparative fit index	  is	  an	  incremental	  fit	  index,	  which	  evaluates	  the	  relative	  enhancement	  of	  the	  presented	  model	  fit	  over	  that	  of	  the	  independence	  model	  (Kline, 2011).  Incremental fit indexes can be criticized because they assume zero 
covariances among observed variables.  However, when evaluated along with other fit 
indices, such as the RMSEA, they provide helpful information.  Researchers believe the 
CFI threshold for adequate fit if greater than, or equal to, .95 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
The expected cross-validation index is used to compare non-nested models.  Non-
nested models are structures that do not carry the same variables.  Nested models, on the 
other hand, hold the same variables, and can be differentiated only through an additional 
subset of parameters present in one of the identified structures (Maruyama, 1998).  The 
ECVI, is designed to contrast non-nested models, carrying different variables.  The index 
helps an investigator select the model with that has will best cross-validate in a similar 
sample.  The ECVI of a single model presents very little information.  However, when 
comparing the ECVI values to multiple models, the index can be used to rank cross 
validation capacities.  The model with the lowest ECVI is thought to have the best fit 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1989). 
Validation 
After identifying the model with the best fit.  The full sample was submitted to an 
analysis of variance.  This statistical technique was used to further assess the developed 
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scale’s validity.  Specifically, the relationship between scores on the CSCS and scores on 
a self-report behavioral frequency item were evaluated.  
Summary 
This chapter discussed the methodology that was used in the study.  This included 
an explanation of each phase of test construction.  Specific attention was given to the 
research design, participant recruitment, test development, and quantitative assessment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
This chapter describes the results and conclusions of the scale development 
phases discussed in Chapter 3.  It also highlights the results of the research questions 
introduced in Chapter 1.  In an effort to provide a linear depiction of this study’s findings, 
this chapter begins with a discussion of the phase 1 and phase 2 results.  Because these 
stages of scale development were described in detail as part of chapter 3, the discussions 
attributed to these phases within this chapter are limited to brief summaries.  This chapter 
then continues with a more thorough report of the phase 3 and 4 findings.   The results 
section is concluded by an explanation of the research findings.  
Planning 
Participants 
 In exchange for the results of this project, the Colorado Department of 
Transportation (CDOT) agreed to participate in the study.  In total, 1,909 CDOT 
employees (60% response rate) completed the measure.  After eliminating ineligible 
individuals, 907 employees were retained as participants in the study.   
Construction 
Corporate Safety Culture Scale 
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 To ensure that the items created for the CSCS were applicable to the 
transportation industry, a cognitive interview was held with the CDOT Safety 
Committee.  Through the cognitive interview, the items pool was paired down to twenty-
four items, with approximately 8 items addressing each of the established domains.  The 
item pool was then submitted to an expert review.  In this step, designed to increase 
validity, the items pool was distributed to a group of 23 graduate students.  The students 
assessed the extent to which each item addressed the intended culture domain.  Those 
items that were not shown to have “very good” fit were eliminated.  After this process, 
the following nineteen items remained: 
Q6 Employees feel free to report safety hazards 
Q8 Employee safety is not sacrificed for production during a job 
Q16 I know how to avoid safety hazards 
Q18 Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards 
Q20 Employee safety is not sacrificed for speed during a job 
Q22 My coworkers look out for my safety 
Q30 I am encouraged to raise safety concerns 
Q32 Employee safety is not sacrificed for quality during a job 
Q40 I pride myself on my ability to work safely 
Q41 Safety is more important than productivity 
Q42 I hope to be known as a safe worker 
Q43 CDOT personnel usually follow safety guidelines 
Q44 Safety at work is as important as safety at home 
Q46 The most important part of completing a job is being safe 
Q47 I would rather be a safe employee than a productive employee 
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Q49 I can prevent and avoid accidents through my personal actions 
Q51 The best employees are usually the safest employees 
Q52 My coworkers see me as a safe worker 
Q53 Safe employees should be rewarded 
Qualitative Analysis 
Tests of Assumptions: Sample size, Factorability of the correlation matrix, Linearity 
 The assumption of sample size was met by with the starting sample  
of 907 cases.  The large sample allowed for the use of a split file analysis (A=EFA) 
(B=CFA) while maintaining an adequate number of cases (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
The factorability of the correlation matrix was clearly shown, as the correlation matrix, 
complete with each anticipated item, revealed many relationships of r=.3 or greater.  
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity was significant at the p<.001 level.  This revealed that the 
variables were not independent. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .931, showing that 
the sample was appropriate for factor analysis.  Linearity was assumed after the 
completion of several random evaluations of variable combinations.  There was no 
evidence of curvilinear relationships.  
Tests of Assumptions: Outliers 
 Outliers were identified using the Mahalanobis distance.  This statistic describes 
the standard distance between “a set of scores for an individual case and the sample 
means for all variables (Kline, 2011).  By comparing the Mahalanobis distance scores for 
each variable with the chi-squared critical values, cases with multivariate outliers were 
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detected.  Cases with Mahalanobis distance scores greater than 43.82 (df=19, p< .001) 
were eliminated.  In total, seventy cases were removed. 
 
Research Question #1 
How well does the experimental factor structure of the Corporate Safety Culture Scale fit 
the data, when compared to an empirically derived factor structure? 
This section provides an explanation of experimental factor structure, and 
compares its fit with empirically derived models.  Exploratory factor analysis was used to 
obtain the empirical factor structure.  Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the 
experimental model, along with the empirical model and a modified empirical model.  
CFA was used to compare the model fit of each of the aforementioned models.  This fit 
was identified using the criteria discussed in chapter three. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
By exploring the independent variance carried by the variables, Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) enabled the researcher to identify the empirical model.  In the 
segment below, the steps taken to uncover the empirical structure are identified.  The 
discussion starts by presenting an explanation of Principle Components Analysis, the data 
reduction technique selected for this project.  The conclusions of the analysis are 
presented with an evaluation of communalities, Eigen values pattern matrices, structural 
matrices, the scree plot, and correlations of identified components.  At each step, the 
decision making process is explained. 
Principle Components Analysis 
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Principle components analysis (PCA) was identified as the optimal analysis for 
the purposes of this project.  PCA is a data reduction technique that accounts for the 
greatest amount of data variance with the fewest of factors.  PCA is different from other 
factor analytic techniques because it evaluates the shared and unique error variance of 
each factor.  As a result, the variability accounted by each factor is maximized.  
Moreover, the identified factors are independent, and do not correlate with one another.  
Communalities 
Communalities are important as they reveal the extent to which an item’s variance 
is explained by the extracted factors.  With this data, essentially a correlation coefficient, 
the investigator was able to identify items that did not fit well with the extracted items.  
Costello & Osborne (2005) reported that items with low values, less than .4, need to be 
removed, or accommodated, through the creation of additional factors.  Because no items 
in this project held commonalities values below .4, all items were retained.   
Eigen values 
Eigen values describe the amount of variance that is accounted by each factor.  
The Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960), suggested that Eigen values greater than or equal to 
one can be considered stable. The Principal components analysis revealed four factors 
carrying Eigen values that met this standard.  These four factors accounted for 65.14% of 
variance.  The Eigen values attributed to each identified factor, and their claimed 
variance can be seen in Table 5. 
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Table 5                            Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Eigen values % Variance Cumulative 
Variance 
1 6.709 35.312 35.312 
2 3.565 18.764 54.076 
3 1.086 5.717 59.793 
4 1.016 5.348 65.141 
 
However, after evaluating the pattern matrix, and eliminating items that were 
cross loaded, two factors were identified.  The specified factors were submitted to 
Oblimin rotation, which allows for the correlation of factors and leads to greater Eigen 
values.  The rotation resulted in a between factors correlation of .25.  When evaluating 
the “elbow” depicted in the scree plot, the decision to select 2 factors was confirmed.  
The amount of variance explained by the first two components was much greater than the 
variance explain by the last ten components.  The Scree plot can be seen below in Figure 
2. 
 
 
 
68	  	  
Figure 2       Scree Plot 
 
 
During the analysis of the Pattern Matrix, the following six items were dropped 
from the scale because they were shown to load on at least two factors.  
Q16 =I know how to avoid safety hazards 
Q43= CDOT personnel usually follow safety guidelines 
Q47= I would rather be a safe employee than a productive employee 
Q49= I can prevent and avoid accidents through my personal actions 
Q52=My coworkers see me as a safe worker 
Q53=Safe employees should be rewarded 
Based on the suggestions of Tabachnick & Fidell, (2001) factors with loadings of 
.40 or greater were extracted and identified.  Items loading on factor one addressed 
behavioral and performance and expectations.  Accordingly, this factor was identified as 
“Behaviors.”  The second identified factor seemed to hold items created to measure 
values held by employees. Accordingly, This factor was labeled “Values.” Two items 
found in this factor (Q40= I pride myself on my ability to work safely, and Q42= I hope 
to be known as a safe worker), were originally anticipated to fall into the “meaning” 
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domain.  However, objective review indicated that they clearly addressed underlying 
values. 
One item, (Q51=The best employees are usually the safest employees) was 
removed because it carried a factor loading below .4 and could not be extracted.  The 
resulting pattern matrix can be seen below in Table 6.  The mean and standard deviations 
of the identified factors is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 6                                                 Pattern Matrix 
 
ID Component Item Domain 
 1 2   
Q6 .770  Employees feel free to report safety hazards 
 
Behavior 
Q8 .840  Employee safety is not sacrificed for production 
during a job 
 
Behavior 
Q18 .787  Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards 
 
Behavior 
Q20 .871  Employee safety is not sacrificed for speed during a 
job 
 
Behavior 
Q22 .483  My coworkers look out for my safety 
 
Behavior 
Q30 .794  I am encouraged to raise safety concerns 
 
Behavior 
Q32 .876  Employee safety is not sacrificed for quality during 
a job 
 
Behavior 
Q40  .825 I pride myself on my ability to work safely 
 
Values 
Q41  .781 Safety is more important than productivity 
 
Values 
Q42  .864 I hope to be known as a safe worker 
 
Values 
Q44 
 
 .833 Safety at work is as important as safety at home Values 
Q46 
 
 .849 The most important part of completing a job is 
being safe 
Values 
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Table 7           Mean and Standard Deviation   
 
Factors 1 2 
1 Behavior 1  
2Values .214** 1 
Mean 31.54 37.84 
SD 3 7 
**significant at the .01 level 
 
 
Tests of Assumptions: Normality 
Because multivariate normality is assumed for the following analysis, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov value was evaluated.  The statistic (p<.001) revealed a violation of 
the normality assumption.  Accordingly, skewness statistics were used to inform variable 
transformation.  However, square root, inverse, reflect, and logarithmic transformations 
did not improve normality within the variables.  Accordingly, the original data was 
retained.  The original skewness and kurtosis values are listed below in Table 8.  As is 
shown, the kurtosis values for all variables were within the normal assumed range except 
Q44. 
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Table 8                                      Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
Variable N Skewness of Original 
Variable 
Kurtosis of 
Original Variable 
Behavior Items 
Q6: Employees feel free 
to report safety hazards 
436 -1.26                                 1.33 
Q8: Employee safety is 
not sacrificed for 
production during a job  
436   -.75 -.233 
Q18: Employees are 
encouraged to fix safety 
hazards 
436    -1.34 2.20 
Q20: Employee safety is 
not sacrificed for speed 
during a job 
436      -.84   .06 
Q22: My coworkers 
look out for my safety 
436 -1.10 1.83 
 
Q30: I am encouraged to 
raise safety concerns 
436     -1.50     2.31 
Q32: Employee safety is 
not sacrificed for quality 
during a job  
436       -.88    .31 
Values Items 
 
Q40: I pride myself on 
my ability to work 
safely 
436       -.64 .91 
Q41: Safety is more 
important than 
productivity 
436 -1.52 2.68 
Q42: I hope to be known 
as a safe worker 
436 -.89 1.53 
Q44: Safety at work is 
as important as safety at 
home 
436 -1.36 3.31 
Q46: The most 
important part of 
completing a job is 
being safe 
436 -1.07 1.46 
 
 
Test of Reliability 
To ensure that the developed scale was consistent and dependable,  the reliability 
of the scale defined in the empirical model was tested prior to further evaluation.  Items 
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with low item-total correlations were removed from the scale.  Question 22 was 
eliminated from the Behavior scale, (r=.53).  No items were dropped from the Values 
scale, as they all had item-total correlations greater than .60.  An appraisal of the two 
domains and the full scale’s reliability is depicted below in Table 9.  DeVellis, (1991) 
suggested that Cronbach’s Alpha values above .7 are acceptable.   
Table 9                                     Cronbach’s Alfpha Values 
 
 Number of Items Alpha 
Behavior Domain 6 .915 
Values Domain 5 .88 
Full CSCS 11 .885 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Empirical Model 
The researchers started the assessment of model fit by testing the empirical model 
developed though discussed Exploratory Factor Analysis.  This measurement model can 
be viewed in Figure 4.  The following fit indices were assessed to compare the fit of the 
empirical model with that of the experimental structure: χ2, RMSEA, CFI, and ECVI.  
The fit indices resulting from the empirical model are listed in Table 11.   
The evaluated indices revealed an inconsistent depiction of model fit.  The chi-
squared value (χ2 = 307.5, df = 43, p<.0001) showed that a significant discrepancy existed 
between the sample and hypothesized covariance matrices.  The RMSEA (.119) did not 
quite meet the standards for a strong model fit.  However, the CFI (.917) statistic did 
describe an acceptable model fit.  The empirical model was shown to carry an ECVI 
score of .813. 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Experimental Model 
In order to provide a comparison of model fit, the investigator’s initial 
experimental structure was developed and evaluated. The experimental model was 
composed of the nineteen items initially submitted to analysis.  The inclusion of all 
nineteen items was unique to the experimental model.  Prior to the CFA, several items 
were removed from analysis due to cross loading, low factor loading, and low item total 
correlations.  The empirical and modified empirical models were developed with the 
remaining eleven items.  Because the experimental model was developed with all 
nineteen items in mind, the eliminated items were retained for the model.  For clear 
depiction of the items included in each model structure see Table 10.  
The experimental model, composed of the initial nineteen items, held seven items 
designed to measure meaning, five items designed to evaluate values, and eight items 
intended to assess behavioral expectations.  The completed structure is shown in Figure 
5.  The model was evaluated using the following fit indices: χ2, RMSEA, CFI, and ECVI. 
The experimental model was not shown to improve the model fit.  When 
compared to the empirical model, the identified indicators revealed a reduced fit.  
Specifically, the χ2  score  (χ2 = 683.048 df = 149, p<.0001) was clearly poorer than that 
of the other tested model.  The RMSEA (.091) was only a slight improvement on the 
empirical model, and the CFI (.888) score revealed a fit that was inferior to that of the 
empirical model.  When compared to the empirical model, the ECVI value of 1.76 
showed that experimental model did not have a strong fit. See Table 11 for a depiction of 
the model fit indices. 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Modifications to Empirical Model 
Because the experimental and empirical models did not present an adequate fit, 
the investigator evaluated a third model, a modified empirical model. The original 
empirical structure narrowly missed adequate model fit, so the investigator consulted the 
modification indices to improve model fit.  Through this process, the researcher identified 
three suggested modifications that had both large modification index values and 
conceptual support.  It was shown that the unexplained error of the following items was 
correlated.  
Q18  Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards   (MI=98.085) 
Q30  I am encouraged to raise safety concerns   
 
Q6  Employees feel free to report safety hazards       (MI=59.275) 
Q30  I am encouraged to raise safety concerns  
 
Q40: I pride myself on my ability to work safely           (MI 20.773) 
Q42: I hope to be known as a safe worker 
 
 
  In each of the three chosen modifications, the language, or theme of the items 
were similar.  Due to these similarities, the correlation in unexplained error made 
conceptual sense.  These similarities were not perceived to be as significant in any other 
pair of survey items.  Specifically, Q18 and Q30 were comparable questions, using 
similar wording.  Both items held the terms “encouraged,” and “safety.”  Further, both 
items referred the resolution of safety problems.  In the same way, Q40 and Q42 carried 
equivalent language that likely caused the correlation of errors.  Most clearly, both items 
carried the words “I,” “safe,” and “work.” Additionally, both Q40 and Q42 held a theme 
of self-reflection.  Q30 and Q6 were also both associated with the identification, and 
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report of safety problems.  As in the other selected modifications, the relationship 
between error terms was supported by the similarity in item purpose and language.   
When accounting for the relationship between the previously mentioned error 
terms, the resulting model demonstrated in an overall acceptable model fit.  The chi-
squared value of (χ2 = 126.54 df = 40, p<.001) was overlooked due to the large sample 
size.  The RMSEA value (.071) suggested a strong fit, and the CFI (.978) confirmed an 
adequate fit.  Further, the ECVI score showed that when compared with the experimental 
model, the modified empirical model had the best fit.  The path analysis of this 
measurement model can be seen in Figure 4.  See Table 11 for a description of the fit 
indices.  
 
 
Table 10                                     Model Composition 
 
Empirical and Modified Empirical Models Experimental 
Model 
Retained Items Eliminated Items—Reasons for elimination All Items 
Retained 
 Cross Loading 
in Pattern 
Matrix 
Carried Factor 
Loading Below 
.4 
Low Item 
Total 
Correlations 
 
Q6, Q8, Q18, Q20, 
Q30, Q32, Q40, 
Q41, Q42, Q44, 
Q46 
Q16, Q43, 
Q47, Q49, 
Q52, Q53  
Q51 Q22 Q6, Q8, Q16, 
Q18, Q20, 
Q22, Q30, 
Q32, Q40, 
Q41, Q42, 
Q43, Q44, 
Q46, Q47, 
Q49, Q51, 
Q52, Q53 
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Table 11                     Comparison of Fit Indices for Tested Models 
 
Tested Models Fit Indices 
 χ2 DF Sig RMSEA CFI ECVI 
Empirical Model 307.5 43 <.001 .119 .917 .813 
Modified Empirical Model 126.54 40 <.001 .071 .973 .410 
Experimental Model 683.04 149 <.001 .091 .888 1.76 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Summary 
 When considering the results shown by the evaluated fit indices, it is clear that 
corporate safety culture is a complex construct that, given the developed items, is best 
measured through the domains identified in the modified empirical model.  It is important 
to note the domains contained in this factor structure retain experimental support. This is 
shown in similarities between the modified empirical model and the experimental model.  
Specifically, both models hold domains related to behavioral expectations, and values. 
The similarity between the modified empirical model and the original experimental 
framework adds support for the conclusions of the CFA.     
Validation 
Research Question #2 
Is there a relationship to between scores on the Corporate Safety Culture Scale and 
safety behaviors? 
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After identifying a reliable model, the validity of the CSCS was evaluated.  The 
researcher endeavored to understand how well the CSCS, along with each identified 
component of the measure, related to safety behavior.  This assessment was completed 
with the use of a single behavioral indicator item found in the full CDOT measure.  The 
selected item is listed below.  
Q61  I received a performance documentation form for using good safety practices during 
the past 12 months. 
Tests of Assumptions: Homogeneity 
Prior to completing the statistical analysis, the assumption of homogeneity was 
evaluated.  Levene’s test of homogeneity showed that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was achieved by the CSCS (p=.071) and the Value domain (p=.474).  However, 
the Behavior domain was shown to have significant homogeneity (p=.01).  To 
accommodate this violation, the Welsh test was consulted when comparing groups. 
Analysis of Variance 
A one-way between groups analysis of variance was completed in effort to assess 
the relationship between safety behavior, measured through the above item, and scores on 
the full Corporate Safety Culture Scale, and the individual factors.  Participants were 
divided into three groups based on their answer to the previously mentioned frequency 
item.  The available response groups were: “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure.”  Scores on the 
full CSCS and the Behavior domain were both shown to be significantly different, at the 
p<.001 level for subjects in the three behavioral frequency groups. Similarly, scores on 
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the value domain were statistically different at the p<.05 level for subjects in the different 
frequency groups.  This finding was corroborated by the conclusions of the Welsh test.   
  A review of the descriptive statistics, shown in Table 11, describes the direction 
of the differences between the “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure” groups.  For the full scale, 
and each of the identified domains, the “Yes” group was shown to have a higher mean 
score than the “No” and “Not Sure” group. This finding suggests that high scorers on the 
CSCS are safer employees than those who score lower. For a visual depiction of these 
findings please see Figures 7, 8, 9. 
Table 12                                          Descriptive Statistics 
 
Full CSCS  
Statistical Measures Identified Groups 
 Yes No Not Sure 
N 233 504 100 
Mean 65.36 62.62 63.36 
SD 7.39 8.36 7.2 
Behavior Domain 
Statistical Measures Identified Groups 
N 233 504 100 
Mean 65.36 62.63 63.36 
SD 7.39 8.36 7.2 
Values Domain 
Statistical Measures Identified Groups 
 Yes No Not Sure 
N 233 504 100 
Mean 31.92 31.39 31.23 
SD 2.7 3.03 3.34 
 
Effect Size 
While the participants in the different behavioral frequency groups were shown to 
have significantly different scores on the CSCS, and the Value and Behavior domains, 
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the effect size for these findings was shown to be small (Cohen, 1988). Specifically, the 
eta squared value for the full measure was .022.  The Behavior domain carried a similarly 
low score of .022, and the Values domain was the lowest, at .007.  
 
Post Hoc 
Tukey HSD Post hoc tests provided more information about significant 
differences shown between participants in the three behavioral frequency groups. The 
statistic showed that on the full CSCS, the average value for the “Yes” group was 
significantly (p<.001) different from the “no” group.  However, neither the “Yes” group 
nor the “No” group were significantly different than the “Not sure” group.  For the Value 
domain, the post hoc statistic showed that none of the groups were significantly (p<.05) 
different from each other.  The final post hoc analysis revealed that on the Behavior 
domain, participants in the “Yes” group scored significantly (p<.001) different than 
participants in the “No” group.  Again, the “Not Sure” group was alternatively shown not 
to score differently than the “Yes” or the “No” group.   
Summary 
This chapter described the development of an empirical model through 
exploratory factor analysis.  It also delineated the model testing process using 
confirmatory factor analysis.  A modified empirical model was shown to have a superior 
model fit.  This identified model was found to hold many theoretical similarities to the 
original conceptual model.  An analysis of validity revealed that the full Corporate Safety 
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Culture Scale and the two identified domains maintained a relationship to safety 
behaviors. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
This project was designed to develop a measure of corporate safety culture for the 
transportation industry that inclusively addressed each domain of corporate culture. This 
chapter provides a summary of the project’s development and results, and presents the 
theoretical implications of the findings.  The limitations of the study and 
recommendations for future research are also discussed.  
General Summary 
Corporate culture is consistently shown to impact organizational growth, 
performance, and safety (Miron, Erez, & Naheh, 2004; Prather, & Turrell, 2002; 
Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Deshpande, Farley, & Webster, 1993).  However, corporate 
leaders may have difficulty evaluating and influencing the culture of companies because 
the construct has been poorly defined in the literature.  Without solid and consistent 
theoretical underpinnings, current tests of corporate of corporate culture are not easily 
understood (Hopfl, 1994).  The objective of this project was to develop a comprehensive 
tool that accounted for the most common definitions of culture.  In particular, the created 
measure was designed to address: (1) Meaning systems, (2) Values, and (3) Behavioral 
expectations.   
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To complete this project, the investigator worked with the Colorado Department 
of Transportation (CDOT).  Because 40% of workplace accidents occur during periods of 
transportation, CDOT places great emphasis on safety.  Leaders in the organization 
reported that they were invested in improving CDOT’s culture as it related to safety 
because they believe positive changes in safety culture lead to increased safety practices.  
With this aspiration in mind, the transportation company partnered with the investigator 
to modify its annual safety survey.  The investigator identified twenty-four items, both 
developed by the researcher and adopted from the original CDOT survey, that 
conceptually fit the hypothesized domains of culture.  After these items were paired down 
through expert review, and factor analysis, eleven items were defined as part of the 
Corporate Safety Culture Scale (CSCS).  
In the development of the Corporate Safety Culture Scale the investigator had two 
major goals; first, to identify the factor structure that fit the data best, and second, to 
evaluate the validity of the final measure. The findings associated with each of these 
goals are discussed in the sections below.  
Factor Structure 
Prior to statistical analysis, the original twenty-four items were submitted to 
expert review.  Through this appraisal, five items were removed from the original scale.  
To identify the factor structure of the CSCS, the data was first submitted to an 
exploratory factor analysis.  During the requisite test of assumptions, the investigator 
determined that sample size was sufficient.  Also, factorability of the correlation matrix 
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was demonstrated, sphericity was significant, and linearity was assumed.  When testing 
the outlier assumption using the Mahalanobis distance, seventy cases were identified as 
multivariate outliers.  Because the investigator was unable to identify any theoretical 
reason for the outliers, all seventy cases were removed.  
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
After testing, and correcting for the assumptions, the data was randomly spit into 
two files.  The first file (A) was used to complete the exploratory factor analysis, which 
allowed for the identification of an empirical model.  Principle components analysis was 
used to explore the data because it allows for the greatest amount of data variance with 
the fewest number of factors.  After eliminating items that were shown to load on 
multiple components, two factors were identified.  When submitting the factors to an 
Oblimin rotation, a between factors correlation of .25 was shown.  In an effort to retain 
only items with robust factor loadings, eleven of the twelve items were extracted.  A 
review of the remaining factor loadings showed two item groupings.  Items grouped on 
the first factor pertained to behavioral expectations.  Items grouped on the second factor 
pertained to employee values.  Accordingly, the empirical model was identified as a two-
factor structure, with the following domains: 1) Behaviors, 2) Values. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
To assess the model fit of the empirical factor structure, the second data file (B) 
was submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis.  Again, the required tests of assumptions 
were completed.  It was discovered that the assumption of normality was violated.  The 
investigator attempted to use skewness statistics to inform variable transformation, but all 
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investigated transformations did not improve normality within the variables.  As a result, 
the original data was retained.  The reliability of the empirical models was also assessed.  
After removing one item from the behavior factor due to a low item-total correlation, the 
reliability of the full scale was shown to be sufficient.  Significant differences were 
consistently shown between the groups.  However, an evaluation of the eta’ squared 
statistic showed that the effect size of these findings was very small.   Although the 
significant differences were shown between group, the power of these differences was 
clearly limited.  
Using CFA, the investigator compared the fit of the empirical model, and the 
experimental model.  The following fit indices were used to evaluate the fit of each 
proposed model: χ2, RMSEA, CFI, and ECVI.  The empirical model carried two factors: 
Values and Behaviors (See Figure 4).  Assessment of the empirical model revealed 
inconsistent fit indices.  Specifically, the chi-squared value was significant, and the 
RMSEA suggested a poor model fit.  The CFI statistic described an adequate model fit, 
and the ECVI carried a score of .813.   
The experimental model was tested in an effort to provide a theoretically 
supported comparison to the empirical model.  The original experimental structure held 
the following three domains: Values, Meaning systems, and Behavioral expectations (See 
Figure 5).  When evaluated through CFA, the experimental structure was shown to fit the 
data worse than the empirical model.  Again, the chi-squared value was significant, and 
the RMSEA identified an inadequate fit.  The CFI statistic described an poor model fit, 
and the ECVI carried a score of 1.76.  
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Since neither the experimental or empirical model was shown to carry a strong fit, 
a third model was assessed.  The original empirical structure, which carried two domains 
(Values, and Behaviors), barely missed sufficient fit.  Consequently, the investigator 
consulted the modification indices, and theory, to enhance model fit.  The resulting model 
was identified as the modified empirical model (See Figure 6).  When evaluated, the 
model was shown to have an adequate model fit.  Each of the evaluated fit indices 
pointed to a strong model fit, except the chi-squared value, which was overlooked due to 
the large sample size. The ECVI value of .410 reveled a better fit than the experimental 
model.  
Validation 
 
After identifying the model that best fit the data, the model’s validity was 
assessed.  Validity was evaluated using a one-way analysis of variance to test the 
relationship between the full CSCS, along with its identified domains, and safety 
behaviors.  Safety behavior was measured by a single behavioral indicator item, listed 
below.  
Q61  I received a performance documentation form for using good safety practices during 
the past 12 months. 
Assumptions: Homogeneity 
Tests of homogeneity showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was achieved by the CSCS and the Value domain, but violated by the Behavior domain.  
Accordingly the Welsh test was considered when contrasting groups. 
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The participants were separated into three groups based on their answer to the 
frequency item, (groups: (1) Yes, (2) No, and (3) Not Sure).  The group member’s scores 
on the full CSCS and each domain were compared.  This evaluation showed that subjects 
in the “Yes” group scored significantly higher, (P<.001) on the CSCS and the Behavior 
domain than subjects in the “no” group.  Similarly, subjects in the “Yes” group also 
scored significantly higher (p<.05) on the Value domain than subjects in the “no” group.  
Descriptive statistics revealed that the “Yes” group scored higher on the CSCS and each 
of the identified domains than the “No” group and the “Not Sure” group.  This finding 
suggested that the CSCS is a valid measure of corporate safety culture.   
The Tukey HSD Post hoc test was used to assess the differences between the 
“Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure” group on the full CSCS and the identified domains.  The 
statistic revealed that the difference between the “Yes” and “No” groups was significant 
(p<.001) for the full scale and the Behavior domain.  However, no significant difference 
was shown for the Values domain.  This finding showed that the scores on the behavioral 
domain of the CSCS are related to scores on the behavioral frequency item, while scores 
on the values domain are unrelated to values on the behavioral frequency item.   
In summary, the results showed that the data is best explained by a modified 
empirical factor structure.  The identified model was shown to be reliable, with a limited 
effect size.  The full CSCS was validated.   
Conclusions 
Identified Model  
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The present study sought to create a comprehensive and inclusive measure of 
corporate culture, which assessed corporate safety culture across the following domains: 
(1) Behavioral expectations, (2) Values, and (3) Meaning systems.  However, this project 
only partially fulfilled this objective.  The factor analyses identified and supported a two 
factor model, composed of a Behavior domain and a Values domain.  
Extant Literature 
A review of the corporate culture literature, shows a mass of research describing 
themes associated with behavioral expectations, values, and meaning systems (Aceves & 
King, 1978; Cunningham & Gresso, 1994; D’Andrade, 1996, Geertz 1973; Kessing & 
Strathern, 1998; Murphy, 1986).  Despite the common presence of these themes, the three 
constructs are not known to be included in any single definition or measure of corporate 
culture.  As was previously explained, the assessment of all three constructs has been 
thwarted because researchers have not been able to successfully include both meaning 
and value-focused items within a single survey.   
Researchers do not attempt the simultaneous measurement of meaning systems 
and values because the concepts are conceptually very similar.  The distinction between 
the constructs is particularly difficult to create and explain in a measurement tool.  As a 
likely consequence, this author knows of no assessment of corporate culture that 
deliberately assesses both meaning systems and values.  Because both constructs are 
present in the research, unique, and individually powerful, current instruments are limited 
by this omission.  
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On the other hand, the construct of behavior is contained in nearly every 
definition of culture  (Aceves & King, 1978; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Cunningham & 
Gresso, 1994; Ember & Ember, 2001; Haviland, 1993;Murphy, 1986; Whitten, & Hunter, 
1987; Steadman, 1982).  Because behavior is effortlessly observed, it is easy to assess.  
As a likely result, employee behavior is often the focus of corporate culture and corporate 
safety culture measures (Safety Performance Solutions, 2010; Thaden, & Gibbons, 2008).  
While the focus on behavior is seen as an important component of culture 
assessment, the extent of this focus is seen as excessive.  As opposed to measuring the 
effects of the underlying culture, many current measures only evaluate the specific 
expectations of management.  This myopic focus on behavior may reflect a 
misunderstanding of the theoretical foundations of culture.  For example, the Safety 
Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS) is a well-known measure that 
devotes approximately 80 percent of it’s questions to behavior-related topics.  The 
fixation on behavior misses the global construct of culture.   
Findings 
This project’s initial aspiration to define and measure culture as the sum of an 
organization’s meaning systems, values, and behavioral expectations, was intended to 
provide a more complete assessment of corporate safety culture.  While the initial theory 
maintains theoretical and intuitive appeal, it was not supported by the project’s findings.   
The data produced can be interpreted in two ways: 1) The hypothesized model 
was incorrect, and corporate safety culture is not best described as the sum of meaning 
90	  	  
systems, values, and beliefs.  Or, 2)  Corporate safety culture was not sufficiently 
addressed by the items developed for present study.  
1) Incorrect Model 
The overwhelming data from the empirical analyses points to the superiority of 
the two factor model, containing a Behavior and a Values domain.  This conclusion fits 
research suggesting that, at its core, safety culture consists of only behavior and values 
(Cooper, 2000).  If this premise is accepted, culture may be explained as values and their 
behavioral indicators alone.  More clearly, an organization’s safety culture might be 
recognized simply as the values held by members of the organization, and reflected in the 
member’s behavioral choices or perceptions.  With this perspective, future investigations 
of safety culture could focus entirely on values, and how those values are revealed 
through behavior. 
This concept may be interpreted further.  If corporate culture can be recognized as 
values held by employees and resulting behavioral decisions, then culture may be most 
efficiently addressed through the measurement of behavior.  If one assumes that behavior 
is the result of values, it may be considered a strong indicator of the underlying culture.   
With this interpretation, the item ratios contained in many of the measures 
discussed in Table 2 makes conceptual sense.  Behaviors are observable, easy to address, 
and easy to measure.  If they are the key to corporate safety culture, measures of culture 
would effectively assess the construct through behavior-based questions.  This 
conceptualization fits the literature well.  Several investigators have described culture as 
“the way we do things around here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Harris, 2004). 
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Although the argument could be made that culture is best assessed with 
consideration only given to behavior, this author posits that it does not seem sensible to 
take this approach.  It is clear that behaviors can be influenced by many factors outside 
the influence of underlying values.  For example, when taking the CSCS, an employee 
might respond positively to Q8, “Employee safety is not sacrificed for production during 
a job.”  While this answer provides information about safety behaviors, it does not 
necessarily provide a reflection of the underlying culture. The positive answer may or 
may not be a result of the employee’s values.  Alternatively, it might reflect the 
employee’s lack of motivation or interest in work.   
In this case, the employee’s ambivalence about productivity could be the cause of 
his/her response.  If an investigator left the analysis at behavior, too much important 
information is left to be assumed.  With the addition of  a Values domain, the investigator 
is able to gain essential information about the underlying culture.  For instance, if the 
previously mentioned employee responded to values-focused Q46, “The most important 
part of completing a job is being safe” A much clearer picture of culture would be 
revealed. 
2) Poor Items  
As part of the item development phase, the investigator completed cognitive 
interviews with the CDOT safety committee.  In this meeting, the investigator presented 
approximately thirty unique items to the safety committee.  The committee paired down 
the accepted items to thirteen. While this process increased the validity, readability, and 
applicability of the created items, it also limited the investigator’s control of item 
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creation.  Because the safety committee was invested in limiting the number of additional 
items, they voted against numerous theoretically supported items.  In the investigator’s 
estimation, the safety committee was unable to understand the theoretical underpinnings 
of prospective items, and incorrectly assumed the same constructs could be measured by 
items that were already included in the original CDOT survey items.   
It is possible that the restrictions on item development and selection influenced 
the investigator’s ability to address the distinct qualities of meaning systems, values, and 
behavioral expectations.  As a result, the similarities between values, and meaning 
systems lead to the grouping of these items into a single factor.  If this is the case, the 
identification of the two factor model is explained by the poor item selection, and the 
investigator’s original theory may be valid.   
Specifically, culture may be evaluated as the sum of an organization’s meaning 
systems, value’s behavioral expectations.  With this interpretation, the implication for 
further research is clear.  More care must be given to the development of items designed 
to measure the distinct constructs of meaning systems and values.  For example, items 
that explicitly address the relationship between safety and meaning.  For example: 
1) I believe that being a safe worker is meaningful,  
2) Meaningful work is always safe,  
3) Being a safe worker is part of my mission in life.   
Each of these items specifically refers to meaning and appears to have greater face 
validity than the items selected in the by the CDOT committee.   
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Limitations 
Demographics  
A major limitation of the item development phase was the lack of demographic 
questions.  Although the investigator suggested that the CDOT Safety Committee include 
a more robust demographic section, the committee argued that demographic questions 
were unnecessary.  They also noted that including demographic questions could 
potentially make CDOT vulnerable to litigation in the future.  The absence of a full 
demographic section clearly limited that investigator’s ability to assess the impact of 
individual characteristics on responses to the CSCS.   
Further, the dearth of demographic information was shown to be particularly 
disadvantageous during the assessment of outliers.  The investigator felt obligated to 
remove seventy cases that were determined to be outliers because no theoretical 
explanation could be discovered.  If demographic information had been gathered as part 
of the survey, the multivariate outliers may have been explained and the removed cases 
may have been retained.  
One of the most necessary, but absent, demographic items concerned the 
participant’s specific tenure with CDOT.  The project was designed to evaluate the safety 
culture of CDOT.  In an effort to observe impact of a the organization’s culture, as 
opposed to the aspersions of management, the decision was made to survey low-level 
participants working in high risk departments.  To measure the true impact of the culture, 
it also would have been helpful to survey participants that had been working with CDOT 
for several years.  Without a question evaluating the participants’ specific tenure with 
94	  	  
CDOT, the responses of newly hired participants were indistinguishable from responses 
produced by long-term employees.   
Because corporate culture may be influenced be a wide range of personal 
characteristics, it will be important for future researchers to create a comprehensive 
demographic survey.  Participant tenure is one of many personal variables that might 
impact an individuals’ perception of corporate culture.   For example, education, 
ethnicity, age, previous experience, salary, and experience with work place accidents 
might all influence a person’s recognition of an organization’s safety culture.   
Outliers 
 As was previously mentioned, the assumption of outliers was violated.  As a 
result, seventy cases with Mahalanobis distance scores greater than 43.82 were removed.  
This was a controversial decision.  From a pure statistical position, the choice makes 
sense.  The outliers were unexplained and skewed the data.  Eliminating the cases 
allowed for a more valid analysis.  However, others might argue the outliers were a 
legitimate aspect of the sample.  It could be said that removing the outliers, without any 
theoretical reason, led to an inaccurate evaluation.   
Skewness & Kurtosis 
 An additional limitation was revealed when the assumption of normality was 
violated.  The investigator attempted to transform variables in an effort to normalize the 
distribution.  However, none of the tested transformations (square root, inverse, reflect, 
and logarithmic) increased normality.  Because analysis of variance is thought to be 
robust to violations of the normality assumption, the original variables were left 
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unchanged.  Given the unpredictable nature of accidents, the non-normality of the data 
made sense.  That said, the non-normality of the data suggests that the results of the 
statistical analysis could be biased or misleading.  
 
 
Expert Review 
Another limitation of this study can be found in the investigator’s efforts to ensure 
the validity of the items.  In the test construction phase, the survey was submitted to 23 
graduate students, who worked to assess the extent to which the proposed items 
addressed the intended culture domains.  While this process was designed to increase the 
validity of the questions, it may have prevented the selection of optimal items.  Some 
might suggest that graduate students are likely to have a different perspective and 
understanding of the hypothesized domains than the expect participants.  Because the 
population that evaluated the survey was very different than the population that took the 
survey, item evaluation may have been inaccurate.  If transportation employees had 
assessed the items, it is possible that a different group of questions would have been 
identified in the initial survey.  
Validity 
 A one-way analysis of variance was used to evaluate the relationship between 
scores on the CSCS, and a single safety behavior indicator item.  In chapter two of this 
project, the decision to complete this analysis using a single item to measure safety 
behavior was discussed and supported.  However, one might argue that a single item is 
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insufficient to measure safety behavior.  Critics could suggest that safety is more 
appropriately measured through previously validated safety measures.  This methodology 
would have been superior as it would have allowed for the use of a regression.  In this 
case, predictive validity would have been assessed.  With the methodology used in the 
present project, the investigator could only compare groups.   
 The use of a single behavioral frequency items also brought into question the 
importance of the full CSCS.  Through the post hoc analysis, the behavior domain was 
shown to relate significantly to scores on the behavioral frequency item.  However, the 
values domain was not shown to have a significant relationship with behavior.  This 
result showed that the CSCS was statistically significant because the behavior domain 
was robust.   
With this result, some might argue that the value domain should be removed from 
the CSCS.  This interpretation is rejected by the investigator.  The non-significance of the 
values domain points to the domain’s inability to relate to behavior.  However it is 
important to remember that the CSCS is designed to assess safety culture.  The research 
clearly shows that values are connected to culture.  To remove the values domain would 
greatly diminish the importance of the CSCS. 
Also, as has been mentioned, the single behavioral frequency item limited the 
breadth of assessment.  It is possible that the value domain would relate significantly with 
other behavioral frequency items.  For example, given the conceptual nature of values, 
the value domain might relate more significantly with behavioral frequency items that 
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involve choice.  The selected item reflects an appraisal given by an individual’s superior.  
The item does not address a choice to behave in a safe manner.   
Effect size 
The analysis of variance showed that employees who received a performance 
documentation form as a result of positive safety behavior scored significantly higher on 
the CSCS, and the identified domains.  The significant relationship between safety 
behavior and scores on the CSCS is very important.  Statistical significance demonstrates 
that a given relationship not likely due to chance.  However, significance does not mean 
the finding is substantive.  The eta squared statistic showed that the difference between 
scores produced by participants in the “Yes,” “No,” and “Not Sure” groups was minor.  
This finding is critical as it reflects the usefulness of the CSCS, and it’s domains.  When 
considering traditional eta squared expectations, (Cohen, 1988), the CSCS  is not seen to 
be substantive.  It is believed that corporate safety culture has a robust relationship with 
safety behavior.  However, a strong relationship was not revealed by the statistical 
analysis.  This finding pulls the value of the CSCS into question. However it is important 
that the reader does not interpret this finding as a reflection on the value of corporate 
safety culture. The extant literature a convincingly argues that corporate safety culture 
has a strong relationship with safety behavior (Erikson, 1997).   
Contamination/Anonymity 
 The CSCS was developed by attaching conceptually supported items to an annual 
safety survey distributed by CDOT.  This approach to test development was simple and 
efficient.  In enabled wide distribution to a range of transportation employees working in 
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high risk jobs.  However, administering the items along with an annual safety survey may 
have reduced the reliability of the data.  The survey was administered by an organization 
that was clearly invested in improving safety.  As a result, participating employees may 
have been concern that negative/unsafe responses would harm their reputation at work.  
CDOT attempted to eliminate this contamination effect by keeping the surveys 
anonymous.  However it is possible that employees were unable to trust the promise of 
confidentiality, and therefore answered the items with fear of penalty.  
Unique Qualities of CSCS 
Length 
The short, straight forward arrangement of the CSCS is an asset because it will 
produce lower dropout rates and limit answer fatigue (Cape, 2010).  Also, from a 
practical stand point, the CSCS may be advantageous in a organizational setting.  As 
organizations pursue productivity goals, efficiency is paramount. With eleven questions, 
the CSCS will make an assessment of culture less demanding, and more feasible. 
While surveys with fewer items have clear advantages, they do carry an inherent 
limitation in scope.  It is very difficult to measure multiple constructs without increasing 
survey size.  The CSCS is a valid measure of corporate safety culture, but it does not 
assess any additional constructs.  This is a limitation of the scale when compared to other 
measures of corporate culture, which evaluate a range of corporate characteristics outside 
the realm of culture. 
Theory  
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Regardless of explanation, the conclusions the present project showed that a two 
factor model best fits the data.   When accepted, this model suggests that safety culture 
can be described simply as a single unitary value.  Safety culture is the sum of values 
held by employees as they pertain to safety.  Behaviors likely represent indicators of 
underlying employee values. 
This finding was unexpected, but theoretically supported by the investigator’s 
original theory and hypothesized model.  Specifically, the investigator posited that 
corporate safety culture can be measured as the sum of an organization’s universally 
accepted meaning systems, values, and behavioral expectations as they relate to safety.  
Factor analysis, did not support the presence of a meaning systems domain, but the 
inclusion of values and behavior was supported.  
Parsimony 
The measurement of values and behavior is not unique to the CSCS.  In fact, 
nearly every measure of corporate safety culture includes an assessment of values, and 
behaviors (Denison, 2010; Diaz-Cabrera, Hernandez-Fernaud, & Esla-Diaz, 2007; Safety 
Performance Solutions, 2010; Thaden & Gibbons, 2008).  However, the CSCS is unique 
because it explicitly and parsimoniously addresses the two constructs.  The other 
evaluated measures assess the domains through the evaluation of disparate organizational 
characteristics that relate to values and behaviors. To view a list of previously developed 
measures, please see Table 2 on page 43. 
The most apparent asset of the CSCS is it’s simplicity.  As an eleven item scale, 
containing two domains, the CSCS comes in stark contrast to other measures of corporate 
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safety culture.  The measures of corporate safety culture evaluated for this project were 
much longer and more complicated.  For example, the well-known Denison 
Organizational Culture Survey contains sixty items, and addresses four domains  
(Denison, 2010). 
Several authors have argued for the importance of parsimony (Gauch, 2003).  
While the three factor model holds conceptual support,  The laws of parsimony, as they 
relate to theory construction suggest that the most simple and elegant solution should be 
accepted. See Figure 3 for a diagram of the accepted model identified through factor 
analysis.  
Figure 3       Accepted Model of Corporate Culture 
 
 
Culture	  
Behaviors	  
Values	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Further Research 
 This project was important because it endeavored to identify a solid definition and 
measure of corporate culture.  However, the investigator’s three factor experimental 
model was not identified in the factor analysis.  Instead, the analysis revealed a solid two 
factor model.  Through this chapter, the investigator has speculated about potential causes 
for the rejection of the experimental model.  However, to truly understand the model 
identification, and corporate safety culture, further research will be necessary.  It is 
important that this project represents the initiation of new approach to the study of 
corporate culture.    
Ideally, a future project will present the CSCS, along with an updated grouping of 
conceptually developed items to several large public and private transportation 
organizations.  If the items consistently reveal the two factor structure carried by the 
current version of the CSCS, the investigator will be able to definitively support the 
measure of values and behaviors in the assessment of safety culture. To truly evaluate the 
validity and importance of any future interactions of the CSCS, the researchers will need 
to analyze the relationship between the scale and safety behavior outcomes.  
Summary 
This chapter discussed the present project at length.  A summary of the purpose, 
methodology, and conclusions of the research were presented.  Special attention was 
drawn to the limitations of the study.  In particular, item development restrictions, 
skewed data, poor demographic analysis, validity, and effect size were discussed.  The 
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chapter included an explanation of the investigator’s final thoughts and recommendations 
for further research.  The final section described the implications of the Corporate Safety 
Culture Scale.  	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Figure 4    Empirical Model 
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Figure 5    Experimental Model 
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Figure 6      Modified Empirical Model 
 
 
 
117	  	  
Figure 7    A Comparison of Means: 
Scores on CSCS and Safety Behavior 
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Figure 8    A Comparison of Means: 
   Scores on Behavior Domain and Safety Behavior 
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Figure 9      A Comparison of Means: 
       Scores on Values Domain and Safety Behavior 
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Appendix A 
 
Hi Paul, 
 
I hope all is well with you. I am sorry I have not contacted you in the last months.  After 
our earlier meeting our research team took on a grant proposal that sapped all of our time.  
I wanted to get back to you regarding our discussion of corporate culture, and the role of 
family systems.  Pat, Rob, and I were all very interested in your thoughts.  It will 
definitely be a topic that we consider working with in the future.  Unfortunately, we are 
each busy with individual projects that are temporarily taking time. 
 
I am presently designing a measure of corporate culture for my dissertation, which I will 
propose at the end of September.  I have created an item pool of approximately 40 items 
designed to evaluate 3 global categories of corporate culture.  (observable characteristics, 
motivating factors, & implicit values).  I believe the current measurement tools are 
limited because they only evaluate observable characteristics, (climate) Hopefully, my 
tool will offer a more comprehensive picture of safety culture. 
 
As I developed the items for my measure, I frequently referred to the culture tool you 
used at CDOT.  With your permission, I would like to incorporate some of your items 
into my measure.  I believe you did an excellent job including a wide breath of factors.  
Earlier in the summer, we briefly spoke about using CDOT employees as a sample for 
upcoming projects.  If this is still an option, I would greatly appreciate the opportunity. In 
return, I will provide you with data on your previously administered items, and feedback 
from the results of my project. 
 
I understand that you are very busy, so I really appreciate the attention you have provided 
us at DU. You have already been extremely helpful.  Thank you for your time and 
consideration. 
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Appendix B 
 
Instructions: 
Using the definitions, table and rating scale provided, rate the extent to which each 
item fits within the proposed culture domain.  Also, rate the items’ wording, and 
offer suggestions for poorly written or unfocused items. 
 
Domain Definitions 
Meaning Systems: 
Meaning Systems are underlying mental constructions that allow for the interpretation 
and understanding of how daily events fall into an individual’s personal narrative.  
 
Values: 
Values represent the fundamental moral expectations that an individual uses to appraise 
daily events.  
 
Behavioral Expectations: 
Behavioral Expectations refers to the activities that are anticipated within the course of an 
individual’s employment responsibilities 
 
Rating Scale 
 
Strong Fit        1      2      3    4         5        Weak Fit 
Rating Table 
Items Proposed Culture 
Domain 
 
Domain Fit Score 
I know how to spot safety 
hazards 
 
Meaning Systems  
I know how to avoid safety 
hazards 
Meaning Systems  
I know how to fix safety 
hazards 
Meaning Systems  
I pride myself on my ability to 
work safely 
Meaning Systems  
I hope to be known as a safe Meaning Systems  
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worker 
I avoid accidents by using 
safety practices 
Meaning Systems  
I can prevent and avoid 
accidents through my personal 
actions 
Meaning Systems  
I attempt to correct safety 
hazards at all times 
 
Meaning Systems  
My coworkers see me as a safe 
worker 
Meaning Systems  
CDOT can only be successful if 
it has a strong safety record 
Values  
Safety is more important than 
productivity 
Values  
Safety at work is as important as 
safety at home 
Values  
The most important part of 
completing a job is being safe 
Values  
I would rather be a safe 
employee than a productive 
employee 
Values  
Safe employees should be 
rewarded 
Values  
The best employees are usually 
the safest employees 
Values  
Employees feel free to report 
safety hazards 
 
Behavioral Expectations  
My coworkers are committed to 
the safety of others 
Behavioral Expectations  
Employee safety is not Behavioral Expectations  
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sacrificed for 
production/quantity during a job 
Employees are encouraged to 
fix safety hazards 
Behavioral Expectations  
Employee safety is not 
sacrificed for speed during a job 
 
Behavioral Expectations  
My coworkers look out for my 
safety 
 
Behavioral Expectations  
Employee safety is not 
sacrificed for quality during a 
job 
Behavioral Expectations  
CDOT personnel usually follow 
safety guidelines 
 
Behavioral Expectations  
I am encouraged to raise safety 
concerns 
Behavioral Expectations  
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Appendix C 
  
	   	  	  
 
	  
	  
A.	   Overall	  Safety	  Climate	  	  	   Scale	  Reliability:	  	  .83	  	  .85	  1.	   Overall,	  CDOT	  is	  a	  safe	  place	  to	  work	  13.	   CDOT	  is	  committed	  to	  safety	  25.	   CDOT	  values	  safety	  
	  
B.	   Management	  Support	   Scale	  Reliability:	  	  .87	  	  .91	  2.	   Senior	  management	  (division	  directors,	  RTD’s)	  is	  committed	  to	  safety	  14.	   Senior	  management	  (division	  directors,	  RTD’s)	  helps	  make	  CDOT	  a	  safer	  place	  26.	   Middle	  management	  (section/branch	  heads)	  is	  committed	  to	  safety	  37.	   Middle	  management	  (section/branch	  heads)	  helps	  make	  CDOT	  a	  safer	  place	  
	  
C.	   Supervisor	  Support	   Scale	  Reliability:	  	  .91	  	  .94	  5.	   My	  supervisor	  invests	  time	  to	  keep	  work	  safe	  17.	   My	  supervisor	  invests	  time	  to	  improve	  safety	  29.	   My	  supervisor	  helps	  make	  CDOT	  a	  safer	  place	  
	  
D.	   Coworker	  Support	   Scale	  Reliability:	  	  .88	  	  .90	  10.	   My	  coworkers	  are	  committed	  to	  the	  safety	  of	  others	  22.	   My	  coworkers	  look	  out	  for	  my	  safety	  34.	   My	  coworkers	  help	  make	  CDOT	  a	  safer	  place	  
	  
Colorado	  Department	  of	  Transportation	  
Employee	  Safety	  Survey	  
	  
What	  Do	  You	  Think	  about	  Employee	  Safety	  at	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E.	   Employee	  Support	   Scale	  Reliability:	  	  .71	  	  .75	  3.	   Employees	  take	  all	  safety	  precautions	  before	  doing	  a	  job	  15.	   Employees	  wear	  appropriate	  personal	  protective	  equipment	  27.	   Employees	  do	  not	  take	  unnecessary	  safety	  risks	  at	  work	  38.	   Employees	  wear	  seat	  belts	  when	  riding	  in	  state	  vehicles	  
	  
F.	   Employee	  Involvement	   Scale	  Reliability:	  	  .83	  	  .83	  6.	   Employees	  feel	  free	  to	  report	  safety	  hazards	  18.	   Employees	  are	  encouraged	  to	  fix	  safety	  hazards	  30.	   I	  am	  encouraged	  to	  raise	  safety	  concerns	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Appendix D 	  
Corporate Safety Culture Scale 
 
Q6 Employees feel free to report safety hazards 
Q8 Employee safety is not sacrificed for production during a job 
Q18 Employees are encouraged to fix safety hazards 
Q20 Employee safety is not sacrificed for speed during a job 
Q30 I am encouraged to raise safety concerns 
Q32 Employee safety is not sacrificed for quality during a job 
Q40 I pride myself on my ability to work safely 
Q41 Safety is more important than productivity 
Q42 I hope to be known as a safe worker 
Q44 Safety at work is as important as safety at home 
Q46 The most important part of completing a job is being safe 
 
